Safety Barrier management in the Oil & Gas sectors

Safety Barrier management is an essential part of Operational Risk Management (ORM). In practice, effective Safety Barrier management is very ... SafetyBarriermanagementintheOil&Gassectors ImprovingproductivitywithoutjeopardisingsafetymeansOil&Gascompaniesneedmuchbettercontroloveruncertainty.TopreventaccidentsintheOil&Gasandotherindustries,leadersneedanaccuratepictureoftheircurrentandemergingrisks,andtheirrelativeimportance,tobeabletodeploytheirresourceseffectivelyagainstthem.Variousparadigmshavebeendevelopedtoassesssafetyrisksandmanagethem.ThemostrecentandcomprehensiveisSafetyBarriermanagement,pioneeredasaregulationbytheNorwegianregulatoryauthorityPSA.SafetyBarriermanagementisanessentialpartofOperationalRiskManagement(ORM).Inpractice,effectiveSafetyBarriermanagementisverycomplicatedbecausetheinformationneededisvast,complexandspreadovermultiplesystems,documentsandpeople. Mostcompaniescollate[someof]thisinformationonceamonthintoareportorstaticdashboard.Itthenbecomespracticallyimpossibleforleaderstovalidateorfurtherinterrogatethesesummaryandstaticreports.Theorganisationcanalsobiasthereportsthemselvesbyplayingthereportingperiodstotheiradvantage(i.e.delaybadnewsuntilthe1stofthemonth,sothereistimetofixitbeforethenextreport). DespiteallthesafetyparadigmsandcontrolsputinplacesincedisasterssuchasPiperAlpha,catastrophictragediesstilloccur.Aclearneedremainstoaskwhathasgonesowronginalltheseinstances.ThirtyyearsonfromPiperAlpha,ChrisFlint,HSEDirectorforEnergyrecentlywrotetoalloffshoreoilandgasproductionoperatorsaskingthemtosummarisetheirplansforfurtherimprovingsafetyandtacklingHydrocarbonReleases(HCRs). TheSwissCheesemodelofaccidentcausationhighlightshowdifferentmeansandcontrolstopreventhazardsfailinsuchawaythatthehazardisallowedtopropagatethroughthevarious‘holes’inthecheeseslices,andthatoncethisoccurs,nofurthercheeseslicesexisttoactas‘barriers’topreventanaccidentanditssubsequentconsequences.ASafetyBarrier,bydefinition,isanythingintentionallyputinplacetopreventundesirablesituations,suchasharmtopeopleorlossoflife,butwhichalsoincludesdamagetotheenvironment,toreputationorfinancialloss.Itdoesnotneedtobeaphysicalthing,itcanbe:aprotectivesystemlogic;anorganisationalcontrol,likeapermit(i.e.adrivinglicence);oreventheculturewithinanoffice.Regardlessoftheirnature,theSwissCheesemodelencouragesustobeawareofthedifferentbarriers(slices)andthecorrectiveactionsneededtomitigatetherisksoffailureofeachoneoftheslice’sholes,sothathopefullythoseholesneveralign(i.e.withsuccessivefailureofbarriers)tocauseanaccident.However,weshouldnotjustacceptthatthecheesehasholes. Toreachahigherlevelofsafetyquestionsthatshouldbeaskedinclude:•   Whatcausesthe‘holes’toappearintheSwissCheesesliceinthefirstplace(i.e.whyaresafetybarriersimpairedornoteffective?)•   Howlonghavetheybeeninthatstateandisanybodydoinganythingaboutit? •   Asamanager,doIevenknowtherelativeimportanceofallthedifferentSafetyBarriers?Andtowhatextentdocontrolsthatareimpairedcontributetotheoverallrisk?•   Wherearemybiggestrisks–thesee-throughholes? •   Whataretheconsequencesofacorrespondinghazardevent?SafetyBarriersaredesignedbycompetentprocess-instrument-controlengineers;signedoffbyqualifiedclientrepresentativesandmanagers,andimplementedandtestedduringcommissioning-butthecrucialquestionduringtheoperationshouldbe-aretheyworkingnow? Ifapressuresensorfeedingvariousshutdownlogicarrangementshasbeenbypassedformaintenance,operativesneedtoknowtheincrementalriskthisposestothebarriersitsupports;whenitisexpectedtobefixedandbywhom.Inasmallonshorelow-pressurefacility,thisistypicallymanagedinspreadsheets,andthestakesmaynotbethathigh;inincreasinglycomplexoffshoreassetswithhundredsofthousandsofequipmenttagsandhigh-pressureoperations,thetaskcanbeincrediblydaunting–andthisiswheretheconceptofBarrierManagementcomesintoplay.Therearefourkeychallengesinvolvedinensuringadequatesafetystandardsbyexamininghowtosafeguardoperations,facilitiesandhumanlifeinoffshoreoperations.GainingaunifieddigitalmodeloftheHazardsandBarriersManagersneedtoknowwhichbarrierareaspresentthehighestriskandwhicharetheworstmaintained,amongsthundredsofotherexamples.Allofthesequeriesrequireasufficientlyflexibleandconfigurabledatamodelthatcanbeusedtoextracttheseinsightsandmanymore.Beingabletodrilldownandexplainwhyabarrierisimpaired,enablescorrectiveactionsandcreatestrustinthesystem.ThevolumeandcomplexityofinformationthatmustbeconsideredBarrierimpairmentcanhavemanyorigins.anexampleisthemaintenanceworkordersystemortherecordofstatutoryequipmentandinstrumenttests.InthiscasebarrierimpairmentcanbetheresultofpendingCorrectiveWorkordersorPreventiveWorkorders.ACorrectiveWorkorderusuallymeanssomethingisalreadybroken,andsothepresenceofanoverdueCorrectiveWorkorderimpliestheimpairmentisworsethananoverdueinspection. Thisallleadstotheneedforameanstoquantifybarrierelementimpairmentseveritywhichcanberolleduptoquantifycumulativeriskagainstplantareasormajoraccidenttypes.ForaSafetyBarrierHealthManagementSystemtobeeffective,italsoneedstohaveaccesstoallavailableinformationinnear-real-time.Authors:MurrayCallander(CTO)&JoelChacon(HeadConsultant),EigenLtd 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