The Definition of Morality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

In the normative sense, “morality” refers to a code of conduct that would be accepted by anyone who meets certain intellectual and volitional ... StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy Menu Browse TableofContents What'sNew RandomEntry Chronological Archives About EditorialInformation AbouttheSEP EditorialBoard HowtoCitetheSEP SpecialCharacters AdvancedTools Contact SupportSEP SupporttheSEP PDFsforSEPFriends MakeaDonation SEPIAforLibraries EntryNavigation EntryContents Bibliography AcademicTools FriendsPDFPreview AuthorandCitationInfo BacktoTop TheDefinitionofMoralityFirstpublishedWedApr17,2002;substantiverevisionTueSep8,2020 Thetopicofthisentryisnot—atleastdirectly—moral theory;rather,itisthedefinitionofmorality.Moral theoriesarelargeandcomplexthings;definitionsarenot.The questionofthedefinitionofmoralityisthequestionofidentifying thetargetofmoraltheorizing.Identifyingthistarget enablesustoseedifferentmoraltheoriesasattemptingtocapture theverysamething.Anditenablespsychologists,anthropologists, evolutionarybiologists,andothermoreempirically-orientedtheorists todesigntheirexperimentsorformulatetheirhypotheseswithout prejudicingmatterstoomuchintermsofthespecificcontentacode, judgment,ornormmusthaveinordertocountasdistinctively moral. Theredoesnotseemtobemuchreasontothinkthatasingle definitionofmoralitywillbeapplicabletoallmoraldiscussions. Onereasonforthisisthat“morality”seemstobeusedin twodistinctbroadsenses:adescriptivesenseandanormativesense. Moreparticularly,theterm“morality”canbeused either descriptivelytorefertocertaincodesofconductputforwardby asocietyoragroup(suchasareligion),oracceptedbyan individualforherownbehavior,or normativelytorefertoacodeofconductthat,givenspecified conditions,wouldbeputforwardbyallrationalpeople. Whichofthesetwosensesof“morality”amoral philosopherisusingplaysacrucial,althoughsometimes unacknowledged,roleinthedevelopmentofanethicaltheory.Ifone uses“morality”initsdescriptivesense,andtherefore usesittorefertocodesofconductactuallyputforwardbydistinct groupsorsocieties,onewillalmostcertainlydenythatthereisa universalmoralitythatappliestoallhumanbeings.Thedescriptive useof“morality”istheoneusedbyanthropologistswhen theyreportonthemoralityofthesocietiesthattheystudy. Recently,somecomparativeandevolutionarypsychologists(Haidt2006; Hauser2006;DeWaal1996)havetakenmorality,oraclose anticipationofit,tobepresentamonggroupsofnon-humananimals: primarily,butnotexclusively,otherprimates. Acceptingthattherearetwousesorsensesof “morality”—adescriptivesenseandanormative sense—doesnotcommitonetoholdingthatthe“distinction betweendescriptionsandnorms—betweenwhatisandwhatoughtto be—isobviousandunbridgeable”,assomehaveheldthatit does(Churchland2011:185).Toseethis,notethatitisobviousthat thereisadescriptivesenseofmorality.Thatis,itisobviousthat onecansensiblydescribethemoralitiesofvariousgroupswithout makinganynormativeclaims.Anditshouldbeequallyobviousthat thatonemightholdthatacertaincodeofconductwouldbeput forwardbyallrationalpeopleundercertainconditionswithouthaving anyparticularviewsaboutthenatureoftheis/oughtgaporthe possibilityofcrossingit. Anydefinitionof“morality”inthedescriptivesensewill needtospecifywhichofthecodesputforwardbyasociety orgroupcountasmoral.Eveninsmallhomogeneoussocietiesthathave nowrittenlanguage,distinctionsaresometimesmadebetweenmorality, etiquette,law,andreligion.Andinlargerandmorecomplexsocieties thesedistinctionsareoftensharplymarked.So“morality” cannotbetakentorefertoeverycodeofconductputforwardbya society. Inthenormativesense,“morality”referstoacodeof conductthatwouldbeacceptedbyanyonewhomeetscertain intellectualandvolitionalconditions,almostalwaysincludingthe conditionofbeingrational.Thatapersonmeetstheseconditionsis typicallyexpressedbysayingthatthepersoncountsasamoral agent.However,merelyshowingthatacertaincodewouldbe acceptedbyanymoralagentisnotenoughtoshowthatthecodeisthe moralcode.Itmightwellbethatallmoralagentswouldalsoaccepta codeofprudenceorrationality,butthiswouldnotbyitselfshow thatprudencewaspartofmorality.Sosomethingelsemustbeadded; forexample,thatthecodecanbeunderstoodtoinvolveacertainkind ofimpartiality,orthatitcanbeunderstoodashavingthefunction ofmakingitpossibleforpeopletolivetogetheringroups. Aswe’vejustseen,notallcodesthatareputforwardby societiesorgroupsaremoralcodesinthedescriptivesenseof morality,andnotallcodesthatwouldbeacceptedbyallmoral agentsaremoralcodesinthenormativesenseofmorality.Soany definitionofmorality—ineithersense—willrequire furthercriteria.Still,eachofthesetwoverybriefdescriptionsof codesmightberegardedasofferingsomefeaturesofmoralitythat wouldbeincludedinanyadequatedefinition.Inthatwaytheymight betakentobeofferingsomedefinitionalfeaturesof morality,ineachofitstwosenses.Whenonehasspecifiedenough definitionalfeaturestoallowonetoclassifyalltherelevantmoral theoriesastheoriesofacommonsubject,onemightthenbetakento havegivenadefinitionofmorality.Thisisthesenseof “definition”atworkinthisentry. Explicitattempts,byphilosophers,todefinemoralityarehardto find,atleastsincethebeginningofthetwentiethcentury.One possibleexplanationforthisisthecombinedeffectofearly positivisticworriesaboutthemetaphysicalstatusofnormative properties,followed(oraugmented)byWittgensteinianworriesabout definitionsofanysignificanttermswhatsoever.Whateverthe explanation,whendefinitionshavebeenoffered,theyhavetendedto bedirectedatthenotionofmoraljudgment(Hare1952,1981)rather thanatmoralityitself.However,tothedegreethatthesedefinitions ofmoraljudgmentareadequate,theymight,withoutmucheffort,be convertedintodefinitionsofmoralityinthedescriptivesense.For example,aparticularperson’smoralitymightberegardedasthe contentofthebasicmoraljudgmentsthatpersonispreparedto accept. Onemightuseadetaileddefinitionofmoraljudgmenttodefine moralityinadescriptivesenseinanotherway—otherthansimply asthecontentofaperson’smoraljudgments,orthecontentof themoraljudgmentsthatprevailinacertainsocietyorgroup.In particular,theveryfeaturesofajudgmentthatmakeitqualifyasa moraljudgmentmightbetransposedfromapsychologicalkeyto somethingmoreabstract.Hereisonesimplifiedexample.Supposethat anegativejudgmentofanactiononlycountsasanegativemoral judgmentifitinvolvestheideathatthereisaprimafaciecasefor punishingthataction.Inthatcase,adefinitionofmoralityinthe descriptivesensewillincludeacorrespondingidea:thatthe prohibitionsofmorality,takeninthedescriptivesense,arethose thatarebackedbythethreatofpunishment.Ofcourse,ifonegoes thisroute,otherconditionswillneedtobeincluded,to differentiatemoralityfromcriminallaw. Whatcountsasdefinitionalofmorality,ineithersenseof “morality”,iscontroversial.Moreover,thelinebetween whatispartofadefinition,inthesenseatissue,andwhatispart ofamoraltheory,isnotentirelysharp.Forexample,somemight regarditasdefinitionalofmorality,inthenormativesense,thatit governsonlyinterpersonalinteractions.Others,however,mighttake thistobeasubstantivetheoreticalclaim.Somemighttakeitas definitionalof“morality”initsdescriptivesensethat itbeacodeofconductthatapersonorgrouptakestobemost important.Butothersmightsaythatattentiontoreligioncastsdoubt onthisidea. “Morality”,whenusedinadescriptivesense,hasan importantfeaturethat“morality”inthenormativesense doesnothave:afeaturethatstemsfromitsrelationalnature.This featureisthefollowing:thatifoneisnotamemberoftherelevant societyorgroup,orisnottherelevantindividual,thenacceptinga certainaccountofthecontentofamorality,inthedescriptive sense,hasnoimplicationsforhowonethinksoneshouldbehave.On theotherhand,ifoneacceptsamoraltheory’saccountofmoral agents,andoftheconditionsunderwhichallmoralagentswould endorseacodeofconductasamoralcode,thenoneacceptsthatmoral theory’snormativedefinitionof“morality”. Acceptinganaccountof“morality”inthenormativesense commitsonetoregardingsomebehaviorasimmoral,perhapseven behaviorthatoneistemptedtoperform.Becauseacceptinganaccount of“morality”inthenormativesenseinvolvesthis commitment,itisnotsurprisingthatphilosophersseriouslydisagree aboutwhichaccounttoaccept. 1.IsMoralityUnifiedEnoughtoDefine? 2.DescriptiveDefinitionsof“Morality” 3.ImplicitandExplicitDefinitionsinAlliedFields 4.NormativeDefinitionsof“Morality” 5.Variations 5.1Moralityaslinkedtonormsforresponsestobehavior 5.2Moralityaslinkedtoadvocacyofacode 5.3Moralityaslinkedtoacceptanceofacode 5.4Moralityaslinkedtojustificationtoothers Bibliography AcademicTools OtherInternetResources RelatedEntries 1.IsMoralityUnifiedEnoughtoDefine? Anassumptionsuggestedbytheveryexistenceofthisencyclopedia entryisthatthereissomeunifyingsetoffeaturesinvirtueof whichallmoralsystemscountasmoralsystems.ButSinnott-Armstrong (2016)directlyarguesagainstananalogoushypothesisinconnection withmoraljudgments,andalsoseemstotakethisviewtosuggestthat moralityitselfisnotaunifieddomain.Hepointsoutthatmoral judgmentscannotbeunifiedbyanyappealtothenotionofharmto others,sincetherearesuchthingsasmoralideals,andthereare harmlessbehaviorsthatasignificantnumberofpeopleregardas morallywrong:Sinnott-Armstronggivesexamplesuchascannibalismand flag-burning.Whetherpeoplewhocondemnsuchbehaviorsmorallyare correctinthosejudgmentsislargelyirrelevanttothequestionof whethertheycountasmoralinthefirstplace. Sinnott-Armstrongseemsrightinholdingthatmoraljudgmentscannot bedelimitedfromotherjudgmentssimplybyappealtotheircontent. Itseemsquitepossibleforsomeonetohavebeenraisedinsuchaway astoholdthatitismorallywrongforadultmentowearshorts.And italsoseemsplausiblethat,ashealsoargues,moraljudgments cannotbeidentifiedbyreferencetoanysortofneurologicalfeature commonandpeculiartothemandthemalone.Athirdstrategymightbe toclaimthatmoraljudgmentsarethoseonemakesasaresultof havingbeeninductedintoasocialpracticethathasacertain function.However,thisfunctioncannotsimplybetohelpfacilitate thesortsofsocialinteractionsthatenablesocietiestoflourishand persist,sincetoomanyobviouslynon-moraljudgmentsdothis. Beyondtheproblemjustdescribed,attemptstopickoutmoralcodesin thedescriptivesensebyappealtotheirfunctionoftenseemtobe specifyingthefunctionthatthetheoristthinksmorality,inthe normativesense,wouldserve,ratherthanthefunctionthatactual moralitiesdoserve.Forexample,Greeneclaimsthat moralityisasetofpsychologicaladaptationsthatallowotherwise selfishindividualstoreapthebenefitsofcooperation,(2013:23) andHaidtclaimsthat moralsystemsareinterlockingsetsofvalues,virtues,norms, practices,identities,institutions,technologies,andevolved psychologicalmechanismsthatworktogethertosuppressorregulate self-interestandmakecooperativesocietiespossible.(2011:270) Buttheseclaimsneedtodealwiththeexistenceofdysfunctional moralitiesthatdonotinfactservethesefunctions.Perhapsthis problemcouldbealleviatedbypointingoutthatmanyinstancesofa kindthathaveafunction—forexample,anactualhuman heart—failtofulfillthatfunction. EvenifSinnott-Armstrong’spositioniscorrectwithregardto moralityinthedescriptivesense,theremightneverthelessbeacode ofconductthat,givencertainspecifiedconditions,wouldbeput forwardbyallrationalagents.Thatis,evenifthedescriptivesense ofmoralityisafamily-resemblancenotion,vaguelyborderedand open-textured,orevenifitissignificantlydisjunctiveand disunified,thenormativesensemightnotbe.Bywayofcomparison,we mightthinkofthenotionoffoodintwoways:aswhatpeopleregard asfood,andaswhattheywouldregardasfoodiftheywererationaland fullyinformed.Certainlythereisnotmuchthatunifiesthefirst category:notevenbeingdigestibleornutritious,sincepeopleregard variousindigestibleandnon-nutritioussubstancesasfood,andforego muchthatisdigestibleandnutritious.Butthatdoesnotmeanthatwe cannottheorizeaboutwhatitwouldberationaltoregardasfood. 2.DescriptiveDefinitionsof“Morality” Aninitialnaïveattemptatadescriptivedefinitionof “morality”mighttakeittorefertothemostimportant codeofconductputforwardbyasocietyandacceptedbythemembers ofthatsociety.Buttheexistenceoflargeandheterogeneous societiesraisesconceptualproblemsforsuchadescriptive definition,sincetheremaynotbeanysuchsociety-widecodethatis regardedasmostimportant.Asaresult,adefinitionmightbeoffered inwhich“morality”referstothemostimportantcodeof conductputforwardandacceptedbyanygroup,orevenbyan individual.Apartfromcontainingsomeprohibitionsonharming (certain)others,differentmoralities—when “morality”isunderstoodinthisway—canvaryin contentquitesubstantially. Etiquetteissometimesincludedasapartofmorality,applyingto normsthatareconsideredlessseriousthanthekindsofnormsfor behaviorthataremorecentraltomorality.Hobbesexpressesthissort ofviewwhenheusestheterm“smallmorals”todescribe “decencyofbehavior,ashowonemanshouldsaluteanother,or howamanshouldwashhismouthorpickhisteethbefore company”,anddistinguishesthesefrom“thosequalitiesof mankindthatconcerntheirlivingtogetherinpeaceandunity” (1660[1994]:ChapterXI,paragraph1).Whenetiquetteisincludedas partofmorality,moralityisalmostalwaysbeingunderstoodinthe descriptivesense.Onereasonforthisisthatitisclearthatthe rulesofetiquettearerelativetoasocietyorgroup.Moreover,there arenoplausibleconditionsunderwhichwecouldpickoutthe “correct”rulesofetiquetteasthosethatwouldbe acceptedbyallrationalbeings. Lawisdistinguishedfrommoralitybyhavingexplicitwrittenrules, penalties,andofficialswhointerpretthelawsandapplythe penalties.Althoughthereisoftenconsiderableoverlapintheconduct governedbymoralityandthatgovernedbylaw,lawsareoften evaluated—andchanged—onmoralgrounds.Sometheorists, includingRonaldDworkin(1986),haveevenmaintainedthatthe interpretationoflawmustmakeuseofmorality. Althoughthemoralityofagrouporsocietymayderivefromits religion,moralityandreligionarenotthesamething,eveninthat case.Moralityisonlyaguidetoconduct,whereasreligionisalways morethanthis.Forexample,religionincludesstoriesabouteventsin thepast,usuallyaboutsupernaturalbeings,thatareusedtoexplain orjustifythebehaviorthatitprohibitsorrequires.Althoughthere isoftenaconsiderableoverlapintheconductprohibitedorrequired byreligionandthatprohibitedorrequiredbymorality,religionsmay prohibitorrequiremorethanisprohibitedorrequiredbyguidesto behaviorthatareexplicitlylabeledasmoralguides,andmay recommendsomebehaviorthatisprohibitedbymorality.Evenwhen moralityisnotregardedasthecodeofconductthatisputforwardby aformalreligion,itisoftenthoughttorequiresomereligious explanationandjustification.However,justaswithlaw,some religiouspracticesandpreceptsarecriticizedonmoralgrounds, e.g.,thatthepracticeorpreceptinvolvesdiscriminationonthe basisofrace,gender,orsexualorientation. When“morality”isusedsimplytorefertoacodeof conductputforwardbyanactualgroup,includingasociety,evenif itisdistinguishedfrometiquette,law,andreligion,itisbeing usedinadescriptivesense.Itisalsobeingusedinthedescriptive sensewhenitreferstoimportantattitudesofindividuals.Justas onecanrefertothemoralityoftheGreeks,soonecanrefertothe moralityofaparticularperson.Thisdescriptiveuseof “morality”isnowbecomingmoreprominentbecauseofthe workofpsychologistssuchasJonathanHaidt(2006),whohavebeen influencedbytheviewsofDavidHume(1751),includinghisattemptto presentanaturalisticaccountofmoraljudgments. Guidestobehaviorthatareregardedasmoralitiesnormallyinvolve avoidingandpreventingharmtoothers(Frankena1980),andperhaps somenormofhonesty(Strawson1961).Butalloftheminvolveother mattersaswell,andHare’sviewofmoralityasthatwhichis mostimportantallowsthattheseothermattersmaybemoreimportant thanavoidingandpreventingharmtoothers(Hare1952,1963,1981). Thisviewofmoralityasconcerningthatwhichismostimportanttoa personorgroupallowsmattersrelatedtoreligiouspracticesand precepts,ormattersrelatedtocustomsandtraditions,e.g.,purity andsanctity,tobemoreimportantthanavoidingandpreventing harm. When“morality”isusedinadescriptivesense,moralities candifferfromeachotherquiteextensivelyintheircontentandin thefoundationthatmembersofthesocietyclaimtheirmoralityto have.Somesocietiesmayclaimthattheirmorality,whichismore concernedwithpurityandsanctity,isbasedonthecommandsofGod. Thedescriptivesenseof“morality”,whichallowsforthe viewthatmoralityisbasedonreligioninthisway,picksoutcodes ofconductthatareofteninsignificantconflictwithallnormative accountsofmorality. Asocietymighthaveamoralitythattakesacceptingitstraditions andcustoms,includingacceptingtheauthorityofcertainpeopleand emphasizingloyaltytothegroup,asmoreimportantthanavoidingand preventingharm.Suchamoralitymightnotcountasimmoralany behaviorthatshowsloyaltytothepreferredgroup,evenifthat behaviorcausessignificantharmtoinnocentpeoplewhoarenotin thatgroup.Thefamiliarityofthiskindofmorality,whichmakes in-grouployaltyalmostequivalenttomorality,seemstoallowsome comparativeandevolutionarypsychologists,includingFransDeWaal (1996),toregardnon-humananimalstobeactinginwaysverysimilar tothosethatareregardedasmoral. Althoughallsocietiesincludemorethanjustaconcernforminimizing harmto(some)humanbeingsintheirmoralities,thisfeatureof morality,unlikepurityandsanctity,oracceptingauthorityand emphasizingloyalty,isincludedineverythingthatisregardedasa moralitybyanysociety.Becauseminimizingharmcanconflictwith acceptingauthorityandemphasizingloyalty,therecanbefundamental disagreementswithinasocietyaboutthemorallyrightwaytobehave inparticularkindsofsituations.PhilosopherssuchasBentham(1789) andMill(1861),whoacceptanormativeaccountofmoralitythattakes theavoidingandpreventingharmelementofmoralitytobemost important,criticizeallactualmoralities(referredtoby “morality”inthedescriptivesense)thatgiveprecedence topurityandloyaltywhentheyareinconflictwithavoidingand preventingharm. Somepsychologists,suchasHaidt,takemoralitytoincludeconcern with,atleast,allthreeofthetriadof(1)harm,(2)purity,and (3)loyalty,andholdthatdifferentmembersofasocietycananddo takedifferentfeaturesofmoralitytobemostimportant.Butbeyonda concernwithavoidingandpreventingsuchharmstomembersofcertain groups,theremaybenocommoncontentsharedbyallmoralitiesinthe descriptivesense.Normaytherebeanycommonjustificationthat thosewhoacceptmoralityclaimforit;somemayappealtoreligion, otherstotradition,andotherstorationalhumannature.Beyondthe concernwithharm,theonlyotherfeaturethatalldescriptive moralitieshaveincommonisthattheyareputforwardbyan individualoragroup,usuallyasociety,inwhichcasetheyprovidea guideforthebehaviorofthepeopleinthatgrouporsociety.Inthe descriptivesenseof“morality”,moralitymaynoteven incorporateimpartialitywithregardtoallmoralagents,anditmay notbeuniversalizableinanysignificantway(compareMacIntyre 1957). Althoughmostphilosophersdonotuse“morality”inanyof theabovedescriptivesenses,somephilosophersdo.Ethical relativistssuchasHarman(1975),Westermarck(1960),andPrinz (2007),denythatthereisanyuniversalnormativemoralityandclaim thattheactualmoralitiesofsocietiesorindividualsaretheonly moralitiesthereare.Theserelativistsholdthatonlywhentheterm “morality”isusedinthisdescriptivesenseisthere somethingthat“morality”actuallyrefersto.Theyclaim thatitisamistaketotake“morality”torefertoa universalcodeofconductthat,undercertainconditions,wouldbe endorsedbyallrationalpersons.Althoughethicalrelativistsadmit thatmanyspeakersofEnglishuse“morality”toreferto suchauniversalcodeofconduct,theyclaimsuchpersonsaremistaken inthinkingthatthereisanythingthatisthereferentoftheword “morality”takeninthatsense. Wong(1984,2006,2014)claimstobeanethicalrelativistbecausehe deniesthatthereisanyuniversalmoralcodethatwouldbeendorsed byallrationalpeople.Butwhatseemstostandbehindthisclaimis theideathatthereareculturalvariationsintherelativeweights givento,forexample,considerationsofjusticeandconsiderationsof interpersonalresponsibility.Andheassumesthatthosewhobelievein auniversalmoralityarecommittedtotheideathat“ifthereis fundamentaldisagreement,someonehasgotitwrong”(2014:339). ButGert(2005)iscertainlynotarelativist,anditiscentralto hismoraltheorythattherearefundamentaldisagreementsinthe rankingsofvariousharmsandbenefits,andwithregardtowhois protectedbymorality,andnouniquerightanswerinsuchcases.Wong himselfiswillingtosaythatsomemoralitiesarebetterthanothers, becausehethinksthatthemoraldomainisdelimitedbyafunctional criterion:amongthefunctionsofamoralityarethatitpromoteand regulatesocialcooperation,helpindividualsranktheirown motivations,andreduceharm. Whenusedwithitsdescriptivesense,“morality”canrefer tocodesofconductwithwidelydifferingcontent,andstillbeused unambiguously.Thisparallelsthewayinwhich“law”is usedunambiguouslyeventhoughdifferentsocietieshavelawswith widelydifferingcontent.However,when“morality”isused initsdescriptivesense,itsometimesdoesnotrefertothecodeofa society,buttothecodeofagrouporanindividual.Asaresult, whentheguidetoconductputforwardby,forexample,areligious groupconflictswiththeguidetoconductputforwardbyasociety,it isnotclearwhethertosaythatthereareconflictingmoralities, conflictingelementswithinmorality,orthatthecodeofthe religiousgroupconflictswithmorality. Insmallhomogeneoussocietiestheremaybeaguidetobehaviorthat isputforwardbythesocietyandthatisacceptedby(almost)all membersofthesociety.Forsuchsocietiesthereis(almost)no ambiguityaboutwhichguide“morality”refersto.However, inlargersocietiespeopleoftenbelongtogroupsthatputforward guidestobehaviorthatconflictwiththeguideputforwardbytheir society,andmembersofthesocietydonotalwaysaccepttheguideput forwardbytheirsociety.Iftheyaccepttheconflictingguideofsome othergrouptowhichtheybelong(oftenareligiousgroup)ratherthan theguideputforwardbytheirsociety,incasesofconflicttheywill regardthosewhofollowtheguideputforwardbytheirsocietyas actingimmorally. Inthedescriptivesenseof“morality”,aperson’s ownmoralitycannotbeaguidetobehaviorthatthatpersonwould preferothersnottofollow.However,thatfactthatanindividual adoptsamoralcodeofconductforhisownusedoesnotentailthat thepersonrequiresittobeadoptedbyanyoneelse.An individualmayadoptforhimselfaverydemandingmoralguidethathe thinksmaybetoodifficultformostotherstofollow.Hemayjudge peoplewhodonotadopthiscodeofconductasnotbeingasmorally goodasheis,withoutjudgingthemtobeimmoraliftheydonotadopt it.However,suchcasesdonotunderminetherestriction;aguideis plausiblyreferredtoasamoralityonlywhentheindividualwouldbe willingforotherstofollowit,atleastif “follow”istakentomean“successfully follow”.Foritmaybethattheindividualwouldnotbewilling forotherstotrytofollowthatcode,becauseofworries aboutthebadeffectsofpredictablefailuresduetopartialityor lackofsufficientforesightorintelligence. 3.ImplicitandExplicitDefinitionsinAlliedFields Philosophers,becausetheydonotneedtoproduceoperationaltestsor criteriainthewaythatpsychologists,biologists,and anthropologistsdo,oftensimplytakeforgrantedthateveryoneknows whatbelongs,anddoesnotbelong,tothemoraldomain.Thisattitude findsexpressioninthephilosopher’scommonappealto intuition,ortowhateveryoneagreesabout.Forexample,Michael Smith(1994)providesaverydetailedanalysisofnormativereasons, butindistinguishingspecificallymoralreasonsfromothersortsof reasons,hesaysonlythattheyarepickedoutbyappealtoanumber ofplatitudes.Andhemakesnoefforttoprovideanythinglikea comprehensivelistofsuchplatitudes.Moreover,itisverylikely thattherewillbedisagreementastowhatcountsas platitudinous.Or,ifitisdefinitionalof“platitude” thatitbeuncontroversial,itmaybethatwhatisplatitudinousabout moralitywillbesothinastofailtoseparatemoralityfromother domains.Failingtospecifywhichparticularcriteriaonetakesto governone’sowntheorizing,andconsequentlytacitlyrelyingon theideathateveryonealreadyknowswhatcountsasmoral,canleadto anumberofproblems.One,ofcourse,isaconflationofmoralitywith otherthings(seeMachery2012onChurchland2011).Anotheristhat onemistakesone’sownculturalbiasesforuniversaltruths (HaidtandKesiber2010). Becausetheoristsinpsychologyandanthropologyoftenneedtodesign questionnairesandothersortsofprobesoftheattitudesofsubjects, theymightbeexpectedtobemoresensitivetotheneedfora reasonablyclearmeansofseparatingmoraljudgmentsfromothersorts ofjudgments.Afterall,examiningthespecificallymoraljudgmentsof individualsisoneofthemostdirectmeansofdeterminingwhatthe moralcodeofapersonorgroupmightbe.Butdespitethis expectation,androughlyhalfacenturyago,AbrahamEdel(1962:56) decriedthelackofanexplicitconcerntodelimitthedomainof moralityamonganthropologists,writingthat“morality…is takenforgranted,inthesensethatonecaninvokeitorrefertoit atwill;butitisnotexplained,depicted,oranalysed”.One explanationforthisthatEdelsuggestedisthesameasthe explanationforthesamephenomenoninPhilosophy:“itis assumedthatweallknowwhatmoralityisandnoexplicitaccountneed begiven”.Butthedangerforthosemakingthisassumption,he pointsout,isthatof“mergingthemoralityconceptwithsocial controlconcepts”.Reinforcingthistendencywastheinfluence, inanthropology,ofthesociologistÉmileDurkheim(1906 [2009]),forwhommoralitywassimplyamatterofhowagivensociety enforceswhateversocialrulesithappenstohave. Thefailuretoofferanoperationaldefinitionofmoralityormoral judgmentmayhelpexplainthewidespreadbutdubiousassumptionin contemporaryanthropology,notedbyJamesLaidlaw(2016:456),that altruismistheessentialandirreduciblecoreofethics.ButLaidlaw alsonotesthatmanyofthefeaturesofwhatBernardWilliams(1985) describedas“themoralitysystem”—featuresthat Williamshimselfcriticizedastheparochialresultofa secularizationofChristianvalues—areinfactwidelyshared outsideoftheWest.ThisstateofaffairsleadsLaidlawtoaskthe crucialquestion: Whichfeatures,formalorsubstantive,aresharedbythe “moralitysystem”ofthemodernWestandthoseofthe othermajoragrariancivilizationsandliteratereligions? Thisis,toaverycloseapproximation,arequestforthedefinition ofmoralityinthedescriptivesense. Klenk(2019)notesthatinrecentyearsanthropologyhastakenwhathe termsan“ethicalturn”,recognizingmoralsystems,and ethicsmoregenerally,asadistinctobjectofanthropologicalstudy. ThisisamoveawayfromtheDurkheimianparadigm,andincludesthe studyofself-development,virtues,habits,andtheroleofexplicit deliberationwhenmoralbreakdownsoccur.However,Klenk’s surveyofattemptsbyanthropologiststostudymoralityasan independentdomainleadhimtoconcludethat,sofar,theireffortsdo notreadilyallowadistinctionbetweenmoralconsiderationsandother normativeconsiderationssuchasprudential,epistemic,oraesthetic ones.(2019:342) InlightofEdel’sworryaboutaconflationofmoralsystems withsystemsofsocialcontrol,itisinterestingtoconsiderCurry (2016),whodefendsthehypothesisthat moralityturnsouttobeacollectionofbiologicalandcultural solutionstotheproblemsofcooperationandconflictrecurrentin humansociallife.(2016:29) Currynotesthatrulesrelatedtokinship,mutualism,exchange,and variousformsofconflictresolutionappearinvirtuallyall societies.Andhearguesthatmanyofthemhaveprecursorsinanimal behavior,andcanbeexplainedbyappealtohiscentralhypothesisof moralityasasolutiontoproblemsofcooperationandconflict resolution.Healsonotesthatphilosophers,fromAristotlethrough Hume,Russell,andRawls,alltookcooperationandconflictresolution tobecentralideasinunderstandingmorality.Itisunclear,however, whetherCurry’sviewcanadequatelydistinguishmoralityfrom lawandfromothersystemsthataimtoreduceconflictbyproviding solutionstocoordinationproblems. Turningfromanthropologytopsychology,onesignificanttopicof investigationistheexistenceandnatureofadistinctionbetweenthe moralandtheconventional.Morespecifically,thedistinctionat issueisbetween(a)actsthatarejudgedwrongonlybecauseofa contingentconventionorbecausetheygoagainstthedictatesofsome relevantauthority,and(b)thosethatarejudgedtobewrongquite independentlyofthesethings,thathaveaseriousnesstothem,and thatarejustifiedbyappealtothenotionsofharm,rights,or justice.ElliotTurielemphasizedthisdistinction,anddrewattention tothedanger,ifoneoverlooksit,oflumpingtogethermoralrules withnon-moral“conventionsthatfurtherthecoordinationof socialinteractionswithinsocialsystems”(1983: 109–111).Thosewhoacceptthisdistinctionareimplicitly offeringadefinitionofmoralityinthedescriptivesense.Not everyonedoesacceptthedistinction,however.EdouardMacheryandRon Mallon(2010)forexample,aresuspiciousoftheideathat authority-independence,universality,justificationbyappealtoharm, justice,orrights,andseriousnessformaclusterfoundtogetherwith sufficientregularitytobeusedtosetmoralnormsapartfromother norms.Kellyetal.(2007)aresimilarlyskeptical,andbring empiricalevidencetobearonthequestion. ThepsychologistKurtGraymightbeseenasofferinganaccountof moraljudgmentthatwouldallowustodeterminethemoralityofan individualorgroup.Heandhisco-authorssuggestthat moralityisessentiallyrepresentedbyacognitivetemplatethat combinesaperceivedintentionalagentwithaperceivedsuffering patient.(Gray,Young,&Waytz2012:102) Thisclaim,whilequitestrong,isneverthelessnotasimplausibly strongasitmightseem,sincethethesisisdirectlyconcernedwith thetemplateweusewhenthinkingaboutmoralmatters;itis notdirectlyconcernedwiththenatureofmoralityitself.Inthe senseof“template”atissuehere,thetemplateweuse whenthinkingaboutdogsmightincludehavingfourlegs,atail,and fur,amongotherthings.Butthatdoesnotmeanthatananimalmust havethesefeaturestocountasadog,oreventhatwebelieve this. GiventhewaythatGrayetal.thinkoftemplates,eveniftheir hypothesisiscorrect,itwouldnotmeanthatourpsychologyrequires ustothinkofthemoralasalwaysinvolvingintentionalagentsand perceivingpatients.Inlinewiththis,anddespitesomelapsesin whichtheysuggestthat“moralactscanbedefinedin termsofintentionandsuffering”,(2012:109)theirconsidered viewseemstobeonlythatthedyadictemplatefitsthe majorityofmoralsituations,asweconceivethem.Moreover, thelinkbetweenimmoralbehaviorandsufferingtowhichtheyappeal indefendingtheirgeneralviewissometimessoindirectasto undermineitssignificance.Forexample,theyfitauthorityviolations intotheirsuffering-basedtemplatebynotingthat“authority structuresprovideawayofpeacefullyresolvingconflict”and that“violenceresultswhensocialstructuresare threatened”.Inasimilarstretch,theyaccountforjudgments thatpromiscuityiswrongbygesturingatthesufferinginvolvedin sexuallytransmitteddiseases(2012:107). Anotherpositionincognitivepsychologythathasrelevanceforthe definitionofmoralityinthedescriptivesensetakesmoraljudgment tobeanaturalkind:theproductofaninnatemoralgrammar(Mikhail 2007).Ifmoraljudgmentisanaturalkindinthisway,thena person’smoralcodemightsimplyconsistinthemoraljudgments thatpersonisdisposedtomake.Onepieceofevidencethatthereis suchagrammaristobefoundintherelativeuniversalityofcertain moralconceptsinhumancultures:conceptssuchasobligation, permission,andprohibition.Anotherisanargumentsimilarto Chomsky’sfamous“povertyofthestimulus”argument forauniversalhumangrammar(Dwyeretal.2010;seealsoRoedderand Harman2010). Inevolutionarybiology,moralityissometimessimplyequatedwith fairness(Baumardetal.2013:60,77)orreciprocalaltruism (Alexander1987:77).Butitisalsosometimesidentifiedbyreference toanevolvedcapacitytomakeacertainsortofjudgmentandperhaps alsotosignalthatonehasmadeit(Hauser2006).Thisalsomakes moralityintosomethingverymuchlikeanaturalkind,thatcanbe identifiedbyreferencetocausal/historicalprocesses.Inthatcase, acontent-baseddefinitionofmoralityisn’trequired:certain centralfeaturesareallthatoneneedstobeginone’s theorizing,sincetheywillbeenoughtodrawattentiontocertain psychologicallyandbiologicallyindividuatedmechanisms,andthe studyofmoralitywillbeadetailedinquiryintothenatureand evolutionaryhistoryofthesemechanisms. 4.NormativeDefinitionsof“Morality” Thosewhouse“morality”normativelyholdthatmoralityis (orwouldbe)thebehavioralcodethatmeetsthefollowingcondition: allrationalpersons,undercertainspecifiedconditions,would endorseit.Indeed,thisisaplausiblebasicschemafordefinitions of“morality”inthenormativesense.Althoughsomehold thatnocodecouldmeetthecondition,manytheoristsholdthatthere isonethatdoes;wecancalltheformer“moralskeptics” andthelatter“moralrealists”(seeentriesonLINK: moralskepticismandmoralrealism). Manymoralskepticswouldrejecttheclaimthatthereareany universalethicaltruths,wheretheethicalisabroadercategorythan themoral.Butanotherinterestingclassofmoralskepticsincludes thosewhothinkthatweshouldonlyabandonthenarrowercategoryof themoral—partlybecauseofthenotionofacodethat iscentraltothatcategory.Thesemoralskepticsholdthatweshould doourethicaltheorizingintermsofthegoodlife,orthevirtues. ElizabethAnscombe(1958)gaveexpressiontothiskindofview,which alsofindsechoesintheworkofBernardWilliams(1985).Ontheother hand,somevirtuetheoristsmighttakeperfectrationalitytoentail virtue,andmightunderstandmoralitytobesomethinglikethecode thatsuchapersonwouldimplicitlyendorsebyactinginvirtuous ways.Inthatcase,evenavirtuetheoristmightcountasamoral realistinthesenseabove. Consequentialistviewsmightnotseemtofitthebasicschemafor definitionsof“morality”inthenormativesense,since theydonotappeartomakereferencetothenotionsofendorsementor rationality.Butthisappearanceisdeceptive.Millhimselfexplicitly definesmoralityas therulesandpreceptsforhumanconduct,bytheobservanceofwhich [ahappyexistence]mightbe,tothegreatestextentpossible, secured.(1861[2002:12]) Andhethinksthatthemindisnotina“rightstate” unlessitisin“thestatemostconducivetothegeneral happiness”—inwhichcaseitwouldcertainlyfavormorality asjustcharacterized.Andtheact-consequentialistJ.J.C.Smart (1956)isalsoexplicitthatheisthinkingofethicsasthestudyof howitismostrationaltobehave.Hisembraceofutilitarianismis theresultofhisbeliefthatmaximizingutilityisalwaysthe rationalthingtodo.Onreflectionitisnotsurprisingthatmany moraltheoristsimplicitlyholdthatthecodestheyofferwouldbe endorsedbyallrationalpeople,atleastundercertainconditions. Unlessoneholdsthis,onewillhavetoadmitthat,havingbeenshown thatacertainbehaviorismorallyrequired,arationalpersonmight simplyshrugandask“Sowhat?Whatisthattome?”And, thoughsomeexceptionsarementionedbelow,veryfewmoralrealists thinkthattheirargumentsleavethisoptionopen.Evenfewerthink thisoptionremainsopenifweareallowedtoaddsomeadditional conditionsbeyondmererationality:arestrictiononbeliefs,for example(similartoRawls’(1971:118)veilofignorance),or impartiality. Definitionsofmoralityinthenormativesense—and, consequently,moraltheories—differintheiraccountsof rationality,andintheirspecificationsoftheconditionsunderwhich allrationalpersonswouldnecessarilyendorsethecodeofconduct thatthereforewouldcountasmorality.Thesedefinitionsandtheories alsodifferinhowtheyunderstandwhatitistoendorseacodeinthe relevantway.Relatedtothesedifferences,definitionsof “morality”—andmoraltheories—differwith regardtothosetowhommoralityapplies:thatis,thosewhose behaviorissubjecttomoraljudgment.Someholdthatmoralityapplies onlytothoserationalbeingsthathavecertainspecificfeaturesof humanbeings:featuresthatmakeitrationalforthemtoendorse morality.Thesefeaturesmight,forexample,includefallibilityand vulnerability.Othermoraltheoriesclaimtoputforwardanaccountof moralitythatprovidesaguidetoallrationalbeings,evenifthese beingsdonothavethesehumancharacteristics,e.g.,God. Amongthosewhouse“morality”normatively,virtuallyall holdthat“morality”referstoacodeofconductthat appliestoallwhocanunderstanditandcangoverntheir behaviorbyit,thoughmanyholdthatitprotectsalarger group.Amongsuchtheoristsitisalsocommontoholdthatmorality shouldneverbeoverridden.Thatis,itiscommontoholdthatnoone shouldeverviolateamoralprohibitionorrequirementfornon-moral reasons.Thisclaimistrivialif“should”istakento mean“morallyshould”.Sotheclaimaboutmoral overridingnessistypicallyunderstoodwith“should” meaning“rationallyshould”,withtheresultthatmoral requirementsareassertedtoberationalrequirements.Thoughcommon, thisviewisbynomeansalwaystakenasdefinitional.Sidgwick(1874) despairedofshowingthatrationalityrequiredustochoose moralityoveregoism,thoughhecertainlydidnotthinkrationality requiredegoismeither.Moreexplicitly,Gert(2005)heldthatthough moralbehaviorisalwaysrationallypermissible,itisnot alwaysrationallyrequired.Foot(1972)seemstohaveheld thatanyreason—andthereforeanyrationalrequirement—to actmorallywouldhavetostemfromacontingentcommitmentoran objectiveinterest.Andshealsoseemstohaveheldthatsometimes neitherofthesesortsofreasonsmightbeavailable,sothatmoral behaviormightnotberationallyrequiredforsomeagents.Finally, moralrealistswhoholddesire-basedtheoriesofreasonsandformal, means/endtheoriesofrationalitysometimesexplicitlydenythatmoral behaviorisalwaysevenrationallypermissible(Goldman 2009),andinfactthisseemstobeaconsequenceofFoot’sview aswell,thoughshedoesnotemphasizeit. DespitethefactthattheoristssuchasSidgwick,Gert,Foot,and Goldmandonotholdthatmoralbehaviorisrationallyrequired,they arebynomeansprecludedfromusing“morality”inthe normativesense.Using“morality”inthenormativesense, andholdingthatthereissuchathing,onlyentailsholdingthat rationalpeoplewouldputacertainsystemforward;itdoesnotentail holdingthatrationalpeoplewouldalwaysbemotivatedtofollowthat systemthemselves.Buttothedegreethatatheoristwoulddenyeven theclaimaboutendorsement,andholdinsteadthatrationalpeople mightnotonlyfailtoactmorally,butmightevenrejectitasa publicsystem,thattheoristiseithernotusing “morality”inanormativesense,orisdenyingthe existenceofmoralityinthatsense.Suchatheoristmayalsobeusing “morality”inadescriptivesense,ormaynothaveany particularsenseinmind. When“morality”isusedinitsnormativesense,itneed nothaveeitherofthetwoformalfeaturesthatareessentialto moralitiesreferredtobythedescriptivesense:thatitbeacodeof conductthatisputforwardbyasociety,group,orindividual,or thatitbeacceptedasaguidetobehaviorbythemembersofthat societyorgroup,orbythatindividual.Indeed,itispossiblethat morality,inthenormativesense,hasneverbeenputforwardbyany particularsociety,byanygroupatall,orevenbyanyindividual. Thisispartlyaconsequenceofthefactthat“morality” inthenormativesenseisunderstoodintermsofaconditionalthatis likelytobecounterfactual:itisthecodethatwouldbeendorsedby anyfullyrationalpersonundercertainconditions. Ifoneisamoralrealist,andonealsoacknowledgesthedescriptive senseof“morality”,onemayrequirethatdescriptive moralitiesatleastapproximate,insomeways,moralityinthe normativesense.Thatis,onemightclaimthattheguidestobehavior ofsomesocietieslacksomanyoftheessentialfeaturesofmorality inthenormativesense,thatitisincorrecttosaythatthese societiesevenhaveamoralityinadescriptivesense.Thisisan extremeview,however.Amoremoderatepositionwouldholdthatall societieshavesomethingthatcanberegardedastheirmorality,but thatmanyofthesemoralities—perhaps,indeed,allof them—aredefective.Thatis,amoralrealistmightholdthat althoughtheseactualguidestobehaviorhaveenoughofthefeatures ofnormativemoralitytobeclassifiedasdescriptivemoralities,they wouldnotbeendorsedintheirentiretybyallmoralagents. Whilemoralrealistsdonotclaimthatanyactualsocietyhasorhas everhadmoralityasitsactualguidetoconduct,“natural law”theoriesofmoralityclaimthatanyrationalpersoninany society,evenonethathasadefectivemorality,iscapableofknowing whatgeneralkindsofactionsmoralityprohibits,requires, discourages,encourages,andallows.Inthetheologicalversionof naturallawtheories,suchasthatputforwardbyAquinas,thisis becauseGodimplantedthisknowledgeinthereasonofallpersons.In thesecularversionofnaturallawtheories,suchasthatputforward byHobbes(1660),naturalreasonissufficienttoallowallrational personstoknowwhatmoralityprohibits,requires,etc.Naturallaw theoristsalsoclaimthatmoralityappliestoallrationalpersons, notonlythosenowliving,butalsothosewholivedinthepast. Incontrasttonaturallawtheories,othermoraltheoriesdonothold quitesostrongaviewabouttheuniversalityofknowledgeof morality.Still,manyholdthatmoralityisknowntoallwhocan legitimatelybejudgedbyit.Baier(1958),Rawls(1971)and contractariansdenythattherecanbeanesotericmorality: onethatjudgespeopleeventhoughtheycannotknowwhatitprohibits, requires,etc.Foralloftheabovetheorists,moralityiswhatwecan callapublicsystem:asystemofnorms(1)thatisknowable byallthosetowhomitappliesand(2)thatisnotirrationalforany ofthosetowhomitappliestofollow(Gert2005:10).Moraljudgments ofblamethusdifferfromlegalorreligiousjudgmentsofblamein thattheycannotbemadeaboutpersonswhoarelegitimatelyignorant ofwhattheyarerequiredtodo.Actconsequentialistsseemtohold thateveryoneshouldknowthattheyaremorallyrequiredtoactsoas tobringaboutthebestconsequences,buteventheydonotseemto thinkjudgmentsofmoralblameareappropriateifapersonis legitimatelyignorantofwhatactionwouldbringaboutthebest consequences(Singer1993:228).Parallelviewsseemtobeheldby ruleconsequentialists(Hooker2001:72). Theidealsituationforalegalsystemwouldbethatitbeapublic system.Butinanylargesocietythisisnotpossible.Gamesare closertobeingpublicsystemsandmostadultsplayingagameknowits rules,ortheyknowthattherearejudgeswhoseinterpretation determineswhatbehaviorthegameprohibits,requires,etc.Althougha gameisoftenapublicsystem,itsrulesapplyonlytothoseplaying thegame.Ifapersondoesnotcareenoughaboutthegametoabideby therules,shecanusuallyquit.Moralityistheonepublicsystem thatnorationalpersoncanquit.Thefactthatonecannotquit moralitymeansthatonecandonothingtoescapebeinglegitimately liabletosanctionforviolatingitsnorms,exceptbyceasingtobea moralagent.Moralityappliestopeoplesimplybyvirtueoftheir beingrationalpersonswhoknowwhatmoralityprohibits,requires, etc.,andbeingabletoguidetheirbehavioraccordingly. Publicsystemscanbeformalorinformal.Tosaya publicsystemisinformalistosaythatithasnoauthoritative judgesandnodecisionprocedurethatprovidesauniqueguideto actioninallsituations,orthatresolvesalldisagreements.Tosay thatapublicsystemisformalistosaythatithasoneorbothof thesethings(Gert2005:9).Professionalbasketballisaformal publicsystem;alltheplayersknowthatwhattherefereescallafoul determineswhatisafoul.Pickupbasketballisaninformalpublic system.Theexistenceofpersistentmoraldisagreementsshowsthat moralityismostplausiblyregardedasaninformalpublicsystem.This istrueevenforsuchmoraltheoriesastheDivineCommandtheoryand actutilitarianism,inasmuchastherearenoauthoritativejudgesof God’swill,orofwhichactwillmaximizeutility,andthereare nodecisionproceduresfordeterminingthesethings(Scanlon2011: 261–2).Whenpersistentmoraldisagreementisrecognized,those whounderstandthatmoralityisaninformalpublicsystemadmitthat howoneshouldactismorallyunresolvable,andifsomeresolutionis required,thepoliticalorlegalsystemcanbeusedtoresolveit. Theseformalsystemshavethemeanstoprovideuniqueguides,butthey donotprovidetheuniquelycorrectmoralguidetotheactionthat shouldbeperformed. Animportantexampleofamoralproblemleftunsettledbytheinformal publicsystemofmoralityiswhetherfetusesareimpartiallyprotected bymoralityandsowhetherorunderwhatconditionsabortionsare allowed.Thereiscontinuingdisagreementamongfullyinformedmoral agentsaboutthismoralquestion,eventhoughthelegalandpolitical systemintheUnitedStateshasprovidedfairlyclearguidelinesabout theconditionsunderwhichabortionislegallyallowed.Despitethis importantandcontroversialissue,morality,likeallinformalpublic systems,presupposesagreementonhowtoactinmostmoralsituations, e.g.,allagreethatkillingorseriouslyharminganymoralagent requiresstrongjustificationinordertobemorallyallowed.Noone thinksitismorallyjustifiedtocheat,deceive,injure,orkilla moralagentsimplyinordertogainsufficientmoneytotakea fantasticvacation.Moralmattersareoftenthoughttobe controversialbecauseeverydaydecisions,aboutwhichthereisno controversy,arerarelydiscussed.Theamountofagreementconcerning whatrulesaremoralrules,andonwhenitisjustifiedtoviolateone oftheserules,explainswhymoralitycanbeapublicsystemeven thoughitisaninformalsystem. Byusingthenotionofaninformalpublicsystem,wecanimprovethe basicschemafordefinitionsof“morality”inthe normativesense.Theoldschemawasthatmoralityisthecode thatallrationalpersons,undercertainspecifiedconditions,would endorse.Theimprovedschemaisthatmoralityistheinformal publicsystemthatallrationalpersons,undercertainspecified conditions,wouldendorse.Sometheoristsmightnotregardthe informalnatureofthemoralsystemasdefinitional,holdingthat moralitymightgiveknowablepreciseanswerstoeveryquestion.This wouldhavetheresultthatconscientiousmoralagentsoftencannot knowwhatmoralitypermits,requires,orallows.Somephilosophers denythatthisisagenuinepossibility. Onanydefinitionof“morality”,whetherdescriptiveor normative,itisacodeofconduct.However,onethical-or group-relativistaccountsoronindividualisticaccounts—allof whicharebestregardedasaccountsofmoralityinthedescriptive sense—moralityoftenhasnospecialcontentthatdistinguishes itfromnonmoralcodesofconduct,suchaslaworreligion.Justasa legalcodeofconductcanhavealmostanycontent,aslongasitis capableofguidingbehavior,andareligiouscodeofconducthasno limitsoncontent,mostrelativistandindividualistaccountsof moralityplacefewlimitsonthecontentofamoralcode.Ofcourse, actualcodesdohavecertainminimallimits—otherwisethe societiestheycharacterizewouldlacktheminimumrequireddegreeof socialcooperationrequiredtosustaintheirexistenceovertime.On theotherhand,formoralrealistswhoexplicitlyholdthatmorality isaninformalpublicsystemthatallrationalpersonswouldput forwardforgoverningthebehaviorofallmoralagents,ithasa fairlydefinitecontent.Hobbes(1660),Mill(1861),andmostother non-religiouslyinfluencedphilosophersintheAnglo-American traditionlimitmoralitytobehaviorthat,directlyorindirectly, affectsothers. Theclaimthatmoralityonlygovernsbehaviorthataffectsothersis somewhatcontroversial,andsoprobablyshouldnotbecountedas definitionalofmorality,evenifitturnsouttobeentailedbythe correctmoraltheory.Somehaveclaimedthatmoralityalsogoverns behaviorthataffectsonlytheagentherself,suchastaking recreationaldrugs,masturbation,andnotdevelopingone’s talents.Kant(1785)mayprovideanaccountofthiswideconceptof morality.Interpretedthisway,Kant’stheorystillfitsthe basicschema,butincludestheseself-regardingmoralrequirements becauseoftheparticularaccountofrationalityheemploys.However, paceKant,itisdoubtfulthatallmoralagentswouldput forwardauniversalguidetobehaviorthatgovernsbehaviorthatdoes notaffectthematall.Indeed,whentheconceptofmoralityis completelydistinguishedfromreligion,moralrulesdoseemtolimit theircontenttobehaviorthatdirectlyorindirectlycausesorrisks harmtoothers.Somebehaviorthatseemstoaffectonlyoneself,e.g., takingrecreationaldrugs,mayhaveasignificantindirectharmful effectonothersbysupportingtheillegalandharmfulactivityof thosewhobenefitfromthesaleofthosedrugs. Confusionaboutthecontentofmoralitysometimesarisesbecause moralityisnotdistinguishedsufficientlyfromreligion.Regarding self-affectingbehaviorasgovernedbymoralityissupportedbythe ideathatwearecreatedbyGodandareobligedtoobeyGod’s commands,andsomaybeaholdoverfromthetimewhenmoralitywasnot clearlydistinguishedfromreligion.Thisreligiousholdovermight alsoaffecttheclaimthatsomesexualpracticessuchashomosexuality areimmoral.Thosewhoclearlydistinguishmoralityfromreligion typicallydonotregardsexualorientationasamoralmatter. Itispossibletoholdthathavingacertainsortofsocialgoalis definitionalofmorality(Frankena1963).StephenToulmin(1950)took ittobetheharmonyofsociety.Baier(1958)tookittobe“the goodofeveryonealike”.Utilitarianssometimesclaimitisthe productionofthegreatestgood.Gert(2005)tookittobethe lesseningofevilorharm.Thislattergoalmayseemtobea significantnarrowingoftheutilitarianclaim,bututilitarians alwaysincludethelesseningofharmasessentialtoproducingthe greatestgoodandalmostalloftheirexamplesinvolvetheavoidingor preventingofharm.Itisnotablethattheparadigmcasesofmoral rulesarethosethatprohibitcausingharmdirectlyorindirectly, suchasrulesprohibitingkilling,causingpain,deceiving,and breakingpromises.Eventhosepreceptsthatrequireorencourage positiveaction,suchashelpingtheneedy,arealmostalwaysrelated topreventingorrelievingharms,ratherthanpromotinggoodssuchas pleasure. Amongtheviewsofmoralrealists,differencesincontentareless significantthansimilarities.Forallsuchphilosophers,morality prohibitsactionssuchaskilling,causingpain,deceiving,and breakingpromises.Forsome,moralityalsorequirescharitable actions,butfailuretoactcharitablyoneverypossibleoccasiondoes notrequirejustificationinthesamewaythatanyactofkilling, causingpain,deceiving,andbreakingpromisesrequiresjustification. BothKant(1785)andMill(1861)distinguishbetweendutiesofperfect obligationanddutiesofimperfectobligationandregardnotharming astheformerkindofdutyandhelpingasthelatterkindofduty.For Gert(2005),moralityencouragescharitableaction,butdoesnot requireit;itisalwaysmorallygoodtobecharitable,butitisnot immoralnottobecharitable. Eveniftheplausiblebasicschemafordefinitionsof “morality”inthenormativesenseisaccepted,one’s understandingofwhatmoralityis,inthissense,willstilldepend verysignificantlyonhowoneunderstandsrationality.Ashasalready beenmentioned,morality,inthenormativesense,issometimestaken toprohibitcertainformsofconsensualsexualactivity,ortheuseof recreationaldrugs.Butincludingsuchprohibitionsinanaccountof moralityasauniversalguidethatallrationalpersonswouldput forwardrequiresaveryparticularviewofrationality.Afterall, manywilldenythatitisirrationaltofavorharmlessconsensual sexualactivities,ortofavortheuseofcertaindrugsforpurely recreationalpurposes. Oneconceptofrationalitythatsupportstheexclusionofsexual matters,atleastatthebasiclevel,fromthenormsofmorality,is thatforanactiontocountasirrationalitmustbeanactthatharms oneselfwithoutproducingacompensatingbenefitfor someone—perhapsoneself,perhapssomeoneelse.Suchanaccount ofrationalitymightbecalled“hybrid”,sinceitgives differentrolestoself-interestandtoaltruism.Anaccountof moralitybasedonthehybridconceptofrationalitycouldagreewith Hobbes(1660)thatmoralityisconcernedwithpromotingpeopleliving togetherinpeaceandharmony,whichincludesobeyingtherules prohibitingcausingharmtoothers.Althoughmoralprohibitions againstactionsthatcauseharmorsignificantlyincreasetheriskof harmarenotabsolute,inordertoavoidactingimmorally, justificationisalwaysneededwhenviolatingtheseprohibitions.Kant (1797)seemstoholdthatitisneverjustifiedtoviolatesomeof theseprohibitions,e.g.,theprohibitionagainstlying.Thisis largelyaresultofthefactthatKant’s(1785)conceptof rationalityispurelyformal,incontrastwiththehybridconceptof rationalitydescribedabove. Mostmoralrealistswhooffermoraltheoriesdonotbothertooffer anythinglikeadefinitionofmorality.Instead,whatthese philosophersofferisatheoryofthenatureandjustificationofa setofnormswithwhichtheytaketheiraudiencealreadytobe acquainted.Ineffect,theytacitlypickmoralityoutbyreferenceto certainsalientandrelativeuncontroversialbitsofitscontent:that itprohibitskilling,stealing,deceiving,cheating,andsoon.In fact,thiswouldnotbeabadwayofdefiningmorality,ifthepoint ofsuchadefinitionwereonlytoberelativelytheory-neutral,andto allowtheorizingtobegin.Wecouldcallit“the reference-fixingdefinition”or“thesubstantive definition”(seePrinzandNichols2010:122). Some,includingHare(1952,1963),havebeentemptedtoargueagainst thepossibilityofasubstantivedefinitionofmorality,onthebasis oftheclaimthatmoraldisapprovalisanattitudethatcanbe directedatanythingwhatsoever.Foot(1958a,1958b),arguedagainst thisidea,butthesubstantivedefinitionstillhasthedrawbackis thatitdoesnot,somehow,seemtogetattheessenceofmorality.One mightsuggestthatthesubstantivedefinitionhastheadvantageof includingDivineCommandtheoriesofmorality,whilesuchtheories mightseemtomaketroublefordefinitionsbasedontheplausible schemagivenabove.ButitisplausibletoholdthatDivineCommand theoriesrestonNaturalLawtheories,whichdoinfactfitthe schema.DivineCommandtheoriesthatdonotrestonNaturalLawmight maketroublefortheschema,butonemightalsothinkthatsuch theoriesrestinsteadonaconfusion,sincetheyseemtoentailthat Godmighthavemadeitimmoraltoactbeneficently. 5.Variations Asonegivesmoresubstanceanddetailtothegeneralnotionsof endorsement,rationality,andtherelevantconditionsunderwhich rationalpeoplewouldendorsemorality,onemovesfurtherfrom providingadefinitionofmoralityinthenormativesense,andcloser toprovidinganactualmoraltheory.Andasimilarclaimistruefor definitionsofmoralityinthedescriptivesense,asonespecifiesin moredetailwhatonemeansinclaimingthatapersonorgroupendorses asystemorcode.Inthefollowingfoursubsections,fourbroadways ofmakingthedefinitionsofmoralitymoreprecisearepresented.They areallsufficientlyschematictoberegardedasvarietiesof definition,ratherthanastheories. 5.1Moralityaslinkedtonormsforresponsestobehavior Expressivistsaboutmoralitydonottaketheretobeanyobjective contenttomoralitythatcouldunderwritewhatweabovecalled “thesubstantivedefinition”.Rather,theyexplicitly recognizetheexistenceofsignificantvariationinwhatrulesand idealsdifferentpeopleputforwardasmoralityinthenormative sense.Andtheydoubtthatthisvariationiscompatiblewithmoral realism.Consequently,theyneedtooffersomeunifyingfeaturesof thesedifferentsetsofrulesandideals,despitevariationintheir content.Asaresultofthispressure,someexpressivistsendup offeringexplicitaccountsofadistinctivelymoralattitude onemightholdtowardsanacttokenortype.Theseaccountscanof coursebetakentounderwritevariousformsofmoralityinthe descriptivesense.Buttheycanalsobetakentoprovidethebasisof oneformofmoralrealism. Toseehowanexpressivistviewcanbeco-optedbyamoralrealistof acertainsort,considerAllanGibbard’s(1990)moral expressivism.Gibbardholdsthatmoraljudgmentsareexpressionsof theacceptanceofnormsforfeelingtheemotionsofguiltandanger. OnecanacceptGibbard’sviewofwhatitistoendorseamoral claimwithoutacceptingtheviewthat,inconflicts,alldisagreements arefaultless.Thatis,evenamoralrealistcanuseGibbard’s viewofthenatureofmoraljudgment,andextractfromitadefinition ofmorality.Usedbysuchatheorist,Gibbard’sviewentails thatmorality,inthenormativesense,isthecodethatispickedout bythecorrectsetofnormsforfeelingguiltandanger:that is,thenormsarationalpersonwouldendorse.Thisis equivalenttoacceptingtheplausiblegeneralschemaforadefinition of“morality”givenabove,andunderstandingendorsement inaspecialsense.Toendorseacodeintherelevantway,onthis definition,istothinkthatviolationsofitsnormsmakeguiltand angerappropriate. CloselyrelatedtoGibbard’saccountisoneaccordingtowhich thenormsofrelevancearenotnormsfortheemotions,butarenorms forotherreactionstobehavior.Forexample,aperson’s moralitymightbethesetofrulesandidealstheyregardaspicked outbyappropriatenormsforpraiseandblame,andothersocial sanctions(Sprigge1964:317).Infact,referencetopraiseandblame maybemoreadequatethanreferencetoguiltandanger,sincethe latterseemonlytopickoutmoralprohibitions,andnottomakeroom fortheideathatmoralityalsorecommendsorencouragescertain behaviorsevenifitdoesnotrequirethem.Forexample,itis plausiblethatthereissuchathingassupererogatoryaction,and thatthespecificationofwhatcountsassupererogatoryispartof morality—whetherinthedescriptiveornormativesense.Butit doesnotseemlikelythatwecanaccountforthispartofmoralityby appealtonormsforguiltandanger,anditisnotatallclearthat thereareemotionsthatareascloselylinkedtosupererogationas guiltandangeraretomoraltransgression.Ontheotherhand,it seemsplausiblethatnormsforpraisingactionmighthelptopickout whatcountsassupererogatory. Anotherversionofthepresentstrategywouldreplacetalkofpraise andblamewithtalkofrewardandpunishment.Thisviewwouldtake moralitytobeasystemthatexplainedwhatkindsofactionsare appropriatelyrewardedand—morecentrally—punished.This sortofview,whichremainscloselyrelatedtoGibbard’s suggestion,canalsoberegardedasfittingthegeneralschemagiven above.Onthisview,thenotionofendorsingacodeisunpackedin termsoftheacceptanceofnormsforrewardandpunishment.Skorupski (1993),followingMill(1861),advocatesadefinitionofmorality alongtheselines,thoughhethenunderstandspunishmentprimarilyin termsofblame,andunderstandsblameasverycloselylinkedto emotion—indeed,merelyhavingtheemotioncancountas blaming—sothattheresultingviewissimilartoGibbard’s inoneimportantway,atleastwhenonefocusesonmoral wrongness. Itiscertainlyplausiblethatitisappropriatetofeelguiltwhen oneactsimmorally,andtofeelangeratthosewhoactimmorally towardsthoseonecaresabout.Itisevenplausiblethatitis onlyappropriate,insomeparticularsenseof “appropriate”,tofeelguiltandangerinconnectionwith moraltransgressions.Sonormsforguiltandangermaywelluniquely pickoutcertainmoralnorms.Andsimilarclaimsmightbemadeabout normsforpraiseandblame.However,itisnotequallyclearthat moralityisproperlydefinedintermsofemotionsorother reactionstobehavior.Foritmaybe,asSkorupskiemphasizes,thatwe needtounderstandguiltandanger,andpraiseandblame,intermsof moralconcepts.Thisworryaboutdirectionofexplanationseemsless pressingforthenotionsofrewardandpunishment.Theseresponsesto behavior,atleastinthemselves,mightsimplybeunderstood intermsofthemetingoutofbenefitsandharms.Ofcoursetheywill onlycountasrewardandpunishmentwhentheyarelinkedto someone’shavingfollowedorviolatedarulethatallrational peoplewouldwanttoseeenforcedbysuchresponses. 5.2Moralityaslinkedtoadvocacyofacode Onewayofunderstandingthenotionofendorsementisasadvocacy. Advocatingacodeisasecond-orthird-personalmatter,sinceone advocatesacodetoothers.Moreover,itisconsistentwithadvocating acode,thatonedoesnotplanonfollowingthatcodeoneself.Justas assertingsomethingonebelievestobefalsestillcountsasasserting it,hypocriticaladvocacyofacodestillcountsasadvocacyofthat code.Whenendorsementisunderstoodasadvocacy,itcanbeusedin definitionsofmorality,inthedescriptivesense,aslongasitis themoralityofagrouporsociety.Andadvocacycanalsobeusedas aninterpretationofendorsementwhenprovidingadefinitionof moralityinthenormativesense.Ofcoursethosewhoaccepta definitionofmoralityinanyofthesesenses—asthecodethata grouporsocietyendorses,orasthecodethatwouldbeuniversally advocatedbyallrationalagentsundercertainconditions—donot holdthattheadvocacywouldnecessarily,orevenprobably,be hypocritical.Buttheydoholdthattheimportantthingaboutamoral code—whatpicksitoutasamoralcode—isthatitwouldbe putforwardbyalltherelevantagents,notthatitwouldbe followedbyallofthem.Thenotionofadvocacyhaslessofa placeinadescriptiveaccountofasingleperson’smorality, sincewhensomeoneishypocriticalweoftendenythattheyreallyhold themoralviewthattheyadvocate. Mill(1861),inadditiontoofferingamoraltheory,takespainsto explainhowmoralitydiffersfromothernormativesystems.Forhim, normsthatsimplypromoteutilityarenormsofexpediency.Inorderto qualifyasmorallywrong,anactmustbeonethatoughttobe punished.Thinkingthatanactofacertainkindoughttobepunished isathird-personalmatter,soitseemsplausibletoputMill’s viewofwhatisdefinitionalofmoralityintothecategorybeing discussedinthissection.Itisworthnotingthathypocrisyis,for Mill,notonlyapossibility,but—giventhepresentsorrystate ofmoraleducation—virtuallyunavoidable.Thatisbecausebeing motivatedtoadvocatepunishmentforacertainkindofactisquite differentfrombeingmotivatedtorefrainfromthatsamekindofact. Advocatingpunishmentforacertainkindofactmightbeone’s utility-maximizingchoice,whileactuallyperformingthatkindofact (trying,ofcourse,toavoiddetection)mightalsobe utility-maximizing.AndforMillwhatdetermineswhatapersonwill advocate,andhowapersonwillact,aretheforeseeableconsequences forthatperson. BernardGert’s(2005)moralviewalsooperateswithadefinition ofmoralitythatunderstandsendorsementasadvocacy,inthesenseof puttingforwardasaguideforallrationalagents.Gertoffersthe followingtwoconditionsasthoseunderwhichallrationalpersons wouldputforwardauniversalguideforgoverningthebehaviorofall moralagents.Thefirstconditionisthattheyareseekingagreement withallotherrationalpersonsormoralagents.Thesecondcondition isthattheyuseonlythosebeliefsthataresharedbyallrational persons:forexample,thattheythemselvesarefallibleandvulnerable andthatallthosetowhommoralityappliesarealsofallibleand vulnerable.Thesecondconditionrulesoutbothreligiousbeliefsand scientificbeliefssincetherearenoreligiousbeliefsorscientific beliefsthatallrationalpersonsshare.Thisconditionisplausible becausenouniversalguidetobehaviorthatappliestoallrational personscanbebasedonbeliefsthatsomeoftheserationalpersonsdo notshare. 5.3Moralityaslinkedtoacceptanceofacode Anotherwayofunderstandingthenotionofendorsementisas acceptance.Unlikeadvocatingacode,acceptingacodeisa first-personalmatter.Itmightincludeintendingtoconform one’sownbehaviortothatcode,feelingguiltywhenonedoes not,andsoon.Onecannothypocriticallyacceptacode.Indeed, hypocrisyissimplyamatterofadvocatingacodeonedoesnotaccept. Sothisnotionofendorsementisavailabletosomeonewhoistryingto provideadefinitionofmoralityinthedescriptivesense,evenwhen consideringasingleperson’smorality. ParadigmaticviewsinthenaturallawtraditionstartingwithAquinas holdboththatthelawsofmoralityhavetheirsourceinGod,andthat theselawsconstitutetheprinciplesofhumanpracticalrationality (Finnis1980;MacIntyre1999).Viewsinthistraditionmaybeseenas usingthebasicschemafordefinitionsofmoralityinthenormative sense,understandingendorsementasacceptance.Membersofthis traditiontypicallyholdthatallrationalpersonsknowwhatkindsof actionsmoralityprohibits,requires,discourages,encourages,and allows.ItiscentraltoAquinas’sviewthatmoralityisknown toallthosewhosebehaviorissubjecttomoraljudgment,evenifthey donotknowoftherevelationsofChristianity.ThisiswhyAquinas holdsthatknowingwhatmoralityprohibitsandrequiresdoesnot involveknowingwhymoralityprohibitsandrequireswhatitdoes. Thosewhobelongtothenaturallawtraditionalsoholdthatreason endorsesactingmorally.Thissortofendorsementofcoursehasa cognitivecomponent.Butitisalsomotivational.Aquinasdoesnot holdthatknowledgeofmoralityisalwayseffective:itcanbeblotted outbyevilpersuasionsorcorrupthabits.Butifreasonisnot opposedbysuchforces,anyrationalpersonwouldnotonlyknowwhat wasprohibitedandrequiredbymorality,butwouldfollowthose prohibitionsandrequirements.So,fornaturallawtheorists, endorsementamountstoacceptance. 5.4Moralityaslinkedtojustificationtoothers Thelackofanexplicitandwidelyaccepteddefinitionofmoralitymay partiallyexplaintheresilienceofact-consequentialistaccountsof morality.Withoutanexplicitdefinition,itmaybeeasiertoignore thefactthatact-consequentialisttheoriesarenotparticularly concernedwithinterpersonalinteractions,buttypicallyapplyjustas welltodesertislandscenariosastoindividualswholivein societies.Inanycase,ithasbeenrecognizedthatinordertocombat consequentialism,itwouldbehelpfultohavesomethinglikea plausibledefinitionofmoralitythatmadeitclearthatthesubject matterofmoralityissomethingdifferentfromsimplythegoodnessand badnessofconsequences.T.M.Scanlon(1982,1998),applyingthis strategy,suggeststhatthesubjectmatterofmorality—whatwe aretalkingabout,whenwetalkaboutmorality—isasystemof rulesfortheregulationofbehaviorthatisnotreasonablyrejectable basedonadesireforinformedunforcedgeneralagreement. Scanlon’ssuggestionregardingthesubjectmatterofmorality caneasilybeseenasaninstanceofthegeneralschemagivenabove. His“systemofrules”isaspecifickindofinformal publicsystem;heunderstandsendorsementbyallrationalpeopleas non-rejectionbyallreasonablepeople;andheoffersaspecific accountoftheconditionsunderwhichmoralagentswouldreachthe relevantagreement.ButScanlonalsoplacesveryheavyemphasisonthe factthatifheisrightaboutthesubjectmatterofmorality,then whatcompliancewithmoralnormsallowsustodoistojustifyour behaviortoothersinwaysthattheycannotreasonablyreject.Indeed, theabilitytojustifyourselvestoreasonablepeopleisaprimary sourceofmoralmotivationforScanlon(seealsoSprigge1964:319). Thismightseemtosuggestasomewhatdifferentdefinitionalclaim aboutmorality:thatmoralityconsistsinthemostbasicnormsin termsofwhichwejustifyourselvestoothers.Butitisplausible thatthispurportedlydefinitionalclaimisbetterthoughtofasa corollaryofScanlon’sparticularversionofthegeneralschema, withendorsementunderstoodasnon-rejection.For,ifmoralityisthe systemofnormsthatwouldbeendorsedinthisway,wecanjustifyour actionstoothersbypointingoutthateventhey,werethey reasonable,wouldhaveendorsedrulesthatallowedourbehavior. StephenDarwall’s(2006)moralviewcanalsobeseenasflowing fromaversionofthegeneralschema,andyieldingclaimsabout justifiabilitytoothers.Darwallclaimsthatmoralityisamatterofequalaccountabilityamongfreeandrationalbeings.Onhisview,I behavemorallytowardsyoutothedegreethatIrespecttheclaimsyou haveauthoritytomakeonme.DarwallalsoholdsthatIwillrespect thoseclaimsifIacknowledgecertainassumptionstowhichIam committedsimplyinvirtueofbeingarational,deliberatingagent.As aresult,hisviewisthatmorality—oratleastthemoralityof obligation—isa“schemeofaccountability”(a certainsortofinformalpublicsystem)thatallrationalpeoplewill endorse.UnlikeScanlon’sview,however,Darwall’sview makesuseofastrongersenseofendorsementthannon-rejection. Specifically,itincludestherecognitionofthereasonsprovidedby theauthoritativedemandsofotherpeople.Andthatrecognitionis positivelymotivational. BothScanlon’sandDarwall’sviewsemphasizethesocial natureofmorality,takeninthenormativesense:Scanlon,by referencetojustificationtoothers;Darwall,byappealtothe relevanceofsecond-personalreasons.ButDarwallbuildsa responsivenesstosecond-personalreasonsintotherelevantnotionof rationality,whileScanlonsimplymakestheempiricalclaimthatmany peoplearemotivatedbyadesiretojustifythemselvestoothers,and notesthathisdefinitionofmoralitywillyieldrulesthatwillallow onetodothis,ifonefollowsthem.Thesortofdefinitiondescribed in section5.1 alsomakesthesocialnatureofmoralityessentialtoit,sinceit centrallyfeaturesthenotionofaresponsetothebehaviorofothers. Thedefinitionsdescribedinsections 5.2 and 5.3 donotentailthesocialnatureofmorality,sinceitis possibletoaccept,andeventoadvocate,acodethatconcernsonly self-regardingbehavior.Butonanyplausibleaccountofrationalitya codethatwouldbeadvocatedbyallmoralagentswillgovern interpersonalinteractions,andwillincluderulesthatprohibit causingharmwithoutsufficientreason.Onlythedefinitionofferedin section5.3 thereforecanbetakenasrealisticallycompatiblewithanegoistic morality. Bibliography Alexander,Richard,1987,TheBiologyofMoralSystems, NewYork:Routledge. Anscombe,G.E.M.,1958,“ModernMoralPhilosophy”, Philosophy,33(124):1–19. doi:10.1017/S0031819100037943 Aquinas,Thomas,c.1270,SummaTheologiae,Paris. Baier,Kurt,1958,TheMoralPointofView,Ithaca,NY: CornellUniversityPress. Baumard,Nicolas,Jean-BaptisteAndré,andDanSperber, 2013,“AMutualisticApproachtoMorality:TheEvolutionof FairnessbyPartnerChoice”,BehavioralandBrain Sciences,36(1):59–78.doi:10.1017/S0140525X11002202 Bentham,Jeremy,1789,AnIntroductiontothePrinciplesof MoralsandLegislation,NewYork:PrometheusBooks,1988. Brink,David,1997,“KantianRationalism:Inescapability, Authority,andSupremacy”,inEthicsandPractical Reason,GarrettCullityandBerysGaut(eds.),Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,pp.255–291. Churchland,Patricia,2011,Braintrust:WhatNeuroscience TellsUsAboutMorality,Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversity Press. Curry,OliverScott,2016,“MoralityasCooperation:A Problem-CentredApproach”,inTheEvolutionof Morality,ToddK.ShackelfordandRanaldHansen(eds.),Cham: Springer,pp.27–51.doi:10.1007/978-3-319-19671-8_2 Darwall,Stephen,2006,TheSecond-personStandpoint: Morality,Respect,andAccountability,Cambridge,MA:Harvard UniversityPress. DeWaal,Frans,1996,GoodNatured:TheOriginsofRightand WronginHumansandOtherAnimals,Cambridge,MA:Harvard UniversityPress. Doris,JohnM.andTheMoralPsychologyResearchGroup(eds.), 2010,TheMoralPsychologyHandbook,Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress.doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.001.0001 Durkheim,Émile,1906[2009],“La Déterminationdufaitmoral”.CollectedinSociologie etPhilosophie,Paris:FélixAlcan,1924.Translatedas “TheDeterminationofMoralFacts”inSociologyand Philosophy,DavidPocock(ed.andtrans.),1953,Reprinted Routledgerevivals.London:Routledge,2009,pp.16–31. Dworkin,Ronald,1986,Law’sEmpire,Cambridge,MA: BelknapPress. Dwyer,Susan,BryceHuebner,andMarcD.Hauser,2010,“The LinguisticAnalogy:Motivations,Results,andSpeculations”, TopicsinCognitiveScience,2(3):486–510. doi:10.1111/j.1756-8765.2009.01064.x Edel,Abraham,1962,“AnthropologyandEthicsinCommon Focus”,TheJournaloftheRoyalAnthropologicalInstitute ofGreatBritainandIreland,92(1):55–72. doi:10.2307/2844321 Finnis,John,1980,NaturalLawandNaturalRights, Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Foot,Philippa,1958a,“MoralBeliefs”, ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,59:83–104. doi:10.1093/aristotelian/59.1.83 –––,1958b,“MoralArguments”, Mind,67(268):502–513. doi:10.1093/mind/LXVII.268.502 –––,1972,“MoralityasaSystemof HypotheticalImperatives”,ThePhilosophicalReview, 81(3):305–316.doi:10.2307/2184328 Frankena,William,1963,“RecentConceptionsof Morality”,inG.NakhnikianandH.Castañeda(eds.), MoralityandtheLanguageofConduct,Detroit,MI:Wayne StateUniversityPress,pp.1–24. –––,1973,Ethics,EnglewoodCliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall. –––,1980,ThinkingaboutMorality,Ann Arbor,MI:UniversityofMichiganPress. Gert,Bernard,2005,Morality:ItsNatureand Justification,RevisedEdition,NewYork:OxfordUniversity Press. Gibbard,Allan,1990,WiseChoices,AptFeelings, Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. Goldman,AlanH.,2009,ReasonsfromWithin:Desiresand Values,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576906.001.0001 Gray,Kurt,LianeYoung,andAdamWaytz,2012,“Mind PerceptionIstheEssenceofMorality”,Psychological Inquiry,23(2):101–124. doi:10.1080/1047840X.2012.651387 Greene,Joshua,2013,MoralTribes:Emotion,Reason,andThe GapbetweenUsandThem,NewYork:Penguin. Haidt,Jonathan,2006,TheHappinessHypothesis:Finding ModernTruthinAncientWisdom,NewYork:BasicBooks. –––,2011,TheRighteousMind:WhyGood PeopleAreDividedbyPoliticsandReligion,NewYork: Pantheon. Haidt,JonathanandSelinKesebir,2010,“Morality”, inS.Fiske,D.Gilbert,andG.Lindzey(eds.),HandbookofSocial Psychology,5thEdition,Hobeken,NJ:Wiley,pp. 797–832. Hare,R.M.,1952,TheLanguageofMorals,NewYork: OxfordUniversityPress. –––,1963,FreedomandReason,New York:OxfordUniversityPress. –––,1981,MoralThinking,NewYork: OxfordUniversityPress. Harman,Gilbert,1975,“MoralRelativismDefended”, ThePhilosophicalReview,84(1):3–22. doi:10.2307/2184078 Hauser,Marc,2006,MoralMinds:HowNatureDesignedour UniversalSenseofRightandWrong,NewYork:Harper Collins. Hobbes,Thomas,1660[1994],Leviathan,editedbyEdwin Curly,Indianapolis:HackettPublishingCompany,1994. –––,1658and1651[1991],Manand Citizen,(translationsofsixchaptersofDeHomine (1658)andallofDeCive(1651)),editedbyBernardGert, Indianapolis:HackettPublishingCompany,1991. Hooker,Brad,2001,IdealCode,RealWorld:ARule ConsequentialisttheoryofMorality,Oxford:Clarendon Press. Hume,David,1751[1975],EnquiriesconcerningHuman UnderstandingandconcerningthePrinciplesofMorals,editedby L.A.Selby-Bigge,3rdeditionrevisedbyP.H.Nidditch, Oxford:ClarendonPress,1975. Kant,Immanuel,1785and1797[1993],Groundworkofthe MetaphysicsofMorals:withOnaSupposedRighttoLiebecauseof PhilanthropicConcerns,3rdedition,translatedbyJ. Ellington,Indianapolis:Hackett,1993. Kelly,Daniel,StephenStich,KevinJ.Haley,SerenaJ.Eng,and DanielM.T.Fessler,2007,“Harm,Affect,andthe Moral/ConventionalDistinction”,Mind&Language, 22(2):117–131.doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00302.x Klenk,Michael,2019,“MoralPhilosophyandthe ‘EthicalTurn’inAnthropology”,Zeitschrift FürEthikUndMoralphilosophie,2(2):331–353. doi:10.1007/s42048-019-00040-9 Laidlaw,James,2016,“TheInteractionalFoundationsof EthicsandtheFormationandLimitsofMoralitySystems”, HAU:JournalofEthnographicTheory,6(1):455–461. doi:10.14318/hau6.1.024 Liao,S.Matthew(ed.),2016,MoralBrains.TheNeuroscience ofMorality,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357666.001.0001 –––,1999,DependentRationalAnimals, Chicago:OpenCourt. Machery,Edouard,2012,“DelineatingtheMoral Domain”,BalticInternationalYearbookofCognition, LogicandCommunication,7(1):1–14. doi:10.4148/biyclc.v7i0.1777 Machery,EdouardandRonMallon,2010,“TheEvolutionof Morality”,inDorisandTheMoralPsychologyResearchGroup 2010:3–46. MacIntyre,Alasdair,1957,“WhatMoralityIsNot”, Philosophy,32(123):325–335. doi:10.1017/S0031819100051950 –––,1999,DependentRationalAnimals, Chicago:OpenCourt. Mikhail,John,2007,“UniversalMoralGrammar:Theory, EvidenceandtheFuture”,TrendsinCognitiveSciences, 11(4):143–152.doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.12.007 Mill,JohnStuart,1861[2002],Utilitarianism,editedby G.Sher,Indianapolis:Hackett,2002. Moore,G.E.,1912,Ethics,NewYork:H.Holt. –––,1903,PrincipiaEthica,NewYork: CambridgeUniversityPress,1993. Prinz,Jesse,2007,TheEmotionalConstructionofMorals, Oxford:ClarendonPress. Prinz,JesseandShaunNichols,2010,“Moral Emotions”,inDorisandTheMoralPsychologyResearchGroup 2010:111–146. Rawls,John,1971,ATheoryofJustice,Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress. Roedder,EricaandGilbertHarman,2010,“Linguisticsand MoralTheory”,inDorisandTheMoralPsychologyResearchGroup 2010:273–296. Scanlon,T.M.,1982,“Contractualismand Utilitarianism”,inUtilitarianismandBeyond,Amartya SenandBernardWilliams(eds.),Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,103–128.doi:10.1017/CBO9780511611964.007 –––,1998,WhatWeOwetoEachOther, Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress. –––,2011,“WhatisMorality?”inJ. Shephard,S.Kosslyn,andE.Hammonds(eds.),TheHarvardSampler: LiberalEducationfortheTwenty-FirstCentury,Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress,pp.243–66. Sidgwick,Henry,1874,MethodsofEthics,Indianapolis: HackettPub.Co.,1981. Singer,Peter,1993,PracticalEthics,2nd Edition,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Sinnott-Armstrong,Walter(ed.),2008,MoralPsychologyVolume 1,TheEvolutionofMorality:AdaptationsandInnateness, Cambridge,MA:MITPress. –––,2016,“TheDisunityof Morality”,inLiao2016:331–354. Skorupski,John,1993,“TheDefinitionofMorality”, RoyalInstituteofPhilosophySupplement,35:121–144. doi:10.1017/S1358246100006299 Smart,J.J.C.,1956,“ExtremeandRestricted Utilitarianism”,ThePhilosophicalQuarterly,6(25): 344–354.doi:10.2307/2216786 Smith,Michael,1994,TheMoralProblem,Oxford: Blackwell. Sprigge,TimothyL.S.,1964,“DefinitionofaMoral Judgment”,Philosophy,39(150):301–322. doi:10.1017/S0031819100055777 Strawson,P.F.,1961,“SocialMoralityandIndividual Ideal”,Philosophy,36(136):1–17. doi:10.1017/S003181910005779X Thomson,J.J.andG.Dworkin(eds.),1968,Ethics,New York:Harper&Row. Toulmin,Stephen,1950,AnExaminationofthePlaceofReason inEthics,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Turiel,Elliot,1983,TheDevelopmentofSocialKnowledge: MoralityandConvention,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Warnock,Geoffrey,1971,TheObjectofMorality,London: Methuen. Westermarck,Edward,1960,EthicalRelativity,Paterson, N.J.:Littlefield,Adams. Williams,Bernard,1985,EthicsandtheLimitsof Philosophy,London:Fontana. Wong,DavidB.,1984,MoralRelativity,BerkeleyCA: UniversityofCaliforniaPress. –––,2006,NaturalMoralities:ADefenseof PluralisticRelativism,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress. doi:10.1093/0195305396.001.0001 –––,2014,“IntegratingPhilosophywith AnthropologyinanApproachtoMorality”,Anthropological Theory,14(3):336–355.doi:10.1177/1463499614534554 Wren,T.E.(ed.),1990,TheMoralDomain:Essaysinthe OngoingDiscussionBetweenPhilosophyandtheSocialSciences, Cambridge,MA:MITPress. AcademicTools Howtocitethisentry. PreviewthePDFversionofthisentryatthe FriendsoftheSEPSociety. Lookuptopicsandthinkersrelatedtothisentry attheInternetPhilosophyOntologyProject(InPhO). Enhancedbibliographyforthisentry atPhilPapers,withlinkstoitsdatabase. OtherInternetResources [Pleasecontacttheauthorwithsuggestions.] RelatedEntries consequentialism| ethics:naturallawtradition| Hobbes,Thomas:moralandpoliticalphilosophy| Kant,Immanuel| Mill,JohnStuart| moralrealism| moralrelativism| moralskepticism Copyright©2020by BernardGert JoshuaGert OpenaccesstotheSEPismadepossiblebyaworld-widefundinginitiative. TheEncyclopediaNowNeedsYourSupport PleaseReadHowYouCanHelpKeeptheEncyclopediaFree Browse TableofContents What'sNew RandomEntry Chronological Archives About EditorialInformation AbouttheSEP EditorialBoard HowtoCitetheSEP SpecialCharacters AdvancedTools Contact SupportSEP SupporttheSEP PDFsforSEPFriends MakeaDonation SEPIAforLibraries MirrorSites Viewthissitefromanotherserver: USA(MainSite) Philosophy,StanfordUniversity Infoaboutmirrorsites TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyiscopyright©2021byTheMetaphysicsResearchLab,DepartmentofPhilosophy,StanfordUniversity LibraryofCongressCatalogData:ISSN1095-5054