Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe Current ...
文章推薦指數： 80 %
Although not as significant as in Europe, the United States has also seen an upsurge in political violence considered to be “right-wing extremist” in nature ( ...
Skiptomaincontent(PressEnter).
EuropeanSecurityinthe21stCentury
ClickheretoviewtheentirePRISMVolume6,Number2
Features
NATOinContext:GeopoliticsandtheProblemofRussianPower
ByRobertE.Hunter
NATO'sLandForces:StrengthandSpeedMatter
ByJohnW.Nicholson
NATOandtheNorthAtlantic:RevitalizingCollectiveDefenseandtheMaritimeDomain
ByIneEriksenSøreide
ImplementingtheDesignforMaintainingMaritimeSuperiorityinEuropeandAfrica
ByJamesG.FoggoIIIandEricThompson
TheDisintegrationofEuropeanSecurity:LessonsfromtheRefugeeCrisis
ByFabrizioTassinari
Right-WingExtremismandTerrorisminEuropeCurrentDevelopmentsandIssuesfortheFuture
ByDanielKoehler
EUEnergyPolicySustainedbyFragileSolidarity,IndispensableforEurasianSecurity
ByMemduhKarakullukçu
EuropeanUnionandNATOGlobalCybersecurityChallenges:AWayForward
ByLuukasK.Ilves,TimothyJ.Evans,FrankJ.Cilluffo,andAlecA.Nadeau
Russia’sContradictoryRelationshipwiththeWest
ByPeterZwack
AssessingandAddressingRussianRevanchism
ByJohnHerbst
BookReviews
BookReview,Superpower:ThreeChoicesforAmerica'sRoleintheWorld,byIanBremmer
ByTomFox
BookReview,Terreurdansl'Hexagone:Genèsedudjihadfrançais,ByGillesKepel,withAntoineJardinGallimard
ByI.WilliamZartman
PRISMVolume6,No2
PHOTOINFORMATION
Download
Details
Share
OffensivegegenRechtsblockingthewayofVienna’sfirstPegidademonstration
PoliceinViennaseparate“FightAgainsttheRight”andPEGIDA(“PatrioticEuropeansAgainsttheIslamisationoftheOccident”)activistsduringaFebruary2015demonstration.
PHOTOINFORMATION
Download
Details
Share
PegidaDemonstrationinDresden
January2015PEGIDAdemonstrationinDresden,Germany.Oneprotester(left)holdssignappealingtoRussianPresidentVladimirPutin:“Putin!Helpus,saveusfromthecorrupt,enemy-of-the-peopleBRD[FederalRepublicofGermany]regimeandfromAmericaandIsrael!”
PHOTOINFORMATION
Download
Details
Share
MapoftheEuropeanMigrantCrisis2015
TheongoingconflictinSyriahasspurredthelargestwaveofrefugeesseekingshelterinEuropesinceWorldWarII.
DOWNLOADPDF
DanielKoehleristheDirectoroftheGermanInstituteonRadicalizationandDe-radicalizationStudies(GIRDS)andaFellowatGeorgeWashingtonUniversity’sProgramonExtremismattheCenterforCyberandHomelandSecurity.
Europehasexperiencedarevivalofmilitantright-wingextremistgroups,networks,andincidentsinrecentyears,withasurgeofanti-immigrationandIslamophobicviolence,aswellasanti-governmentattacksandassaultsonpoliticalopponents,ethnicminorities,andhomosexuals.AlthoughnotassignificantasinEurope,theUnitedStateshasalsoseenanupsurgeinpoliticalviolenceconsideredtobe“right-wingextremist”innature(forexample,whitesupremacist,neo-Nazi,racist,oranti-governmentsovereigncitizen).Fortheinternationalaudience,onlyafewoftheseincidentsgainedbroadmediaattention;right-wingextremistattacksareseenmostlyasisolatedeventswhencomparedwithotherattacks,suchasthosebyIslamistextremistterrorists.InGermany,aright-wingterroristgroupcallingitselftheNationalSocialistUndergroundwasdiscoveredin2011.Despitehavingassassinatedatleast10peopleandcommitted2bombingsoverthecourseofalmost14years,ithadgoneundetected.Thatsameyear,AndersBehringBreivikkilled77peopleinabombattackinOsloandamassshootinginUtøya,Norway.IntheUnitedStates,whitesupremacistMichaelPageshotandkilledsixpeopleandwoundedfourothersinanattackagainstaWisconsinSikhtempleinAugust2012.OnlyonedayafterCharlesKurzmanhadarguedintheNewYorkTimesthatright-wingterrorismmightbethemostseveresecuritythreatintheUnitedStates,DylannRoofkilledninepeopleinhisshootingrampageattheEmanuelAfricanMethodistEpiscopalChurchinCharleston,SouthCarolina,onJune17,2015.1SimilareventshavebeenrecordedinmanyWesternEuropeancountries,aswellasinRussiaandEasternEurope.However,thepublicdebatehasnotascribedthesamelevelofimportancetothethreatfromtheextremerightasithasregularlywithIslamistextremism.
Nevertheless,statisticsclearlyshowthesignificantriskposedbyviolentright-wingextremistsinWesterncountries.IntheUnitedStates,forexample,theCombatingTerrorismCenter’sAriePerligercounted4,420violentincidentsperpetratedbyright-wingextremistsbetween1990and2012,causing670fatalitiesand3,053injuredpersons.2Afterthreepeaksin2001,2004,and2008,witheachwavesurpassingthepreviousone,thegeneraltrendisagainupwards.3ProfessorChristopherHewitt’svaluablestudiesaboutterrorismintheUnitedStatesalsoshowthat“whiteracist/rightist”terrorismaccountsfor31.2percentoftheincidentsand51.6percentofterrorism-relatedfatalitiesbetween1954and2000,makingitthenumberonethreataheadof“revolutionaryleft-wing”or“blackmilitant”terrorism.4InboththeUnitedStatesandCanada,awidespreadlackofcoherentanalysisaboutthethreatposedbyextremeright-wingmilitantsstandsinstarkcontrasttothelevelofconcernaboutsuchindividualsexpressedbypoliceofficialsandotherlawenforcementagencies.5Asameansofcomparison,Islamistandright-wingextremistshavecaused45and48casualtiesintheUnitedStates,respectively,sincetheSeptember11,2001attacks.6
InEurope,academicandofficialstatistics—includingtheUniversityofBergen’sTerrorisminWesternEurope:EventsData(TWEED)andEuropol’sannualEuropeanUnionTerrorismSituationandTrendReport(TE-SAT)—showanumberofright-wingattackssinceWorldWarII.7TWEEDregistered648right-wingterroristattacksbetween1950and2004(approximately6percentofatotalof10,239attacks),whileTE-SATregisteredninesuchattacksbetween2006and2013,thoughonlytwowereinWesternEurope.TWEEDalsorevealsthreemainwavesofattacks:Franceintheearly1960s,Italyinthe1970s,andGermanyintheearly1990s.Thesethreenationsalsodominatetheaggregatecountryshareofcasualties.8
RegardingtheTE-SATstatistics,itisimportanttonotethatthenationaldefinitionsandselectioncriteriavarysignificantlyandthatthevastmajorityofviolentcrimescommittedbyindividualsorgroupsmotivatedbyanextremeright-wingagendaarenotcategorizedasterrorismbyEuropol,basedonthenationallegalframeworks.AlthoughallavailablenationalandinternationalstatisticsinEuropeandNorthAmericashowincreasingtrendsinextremeright-wingviolence/terrorism,thebasicphenomenonisbynomeansnew:bothEuropeandtheUnitedStateshaveexperiencedsignificantextremeright-wingattacksandwavesofviolenceduringthepastseveraldecades.
Despitethis,onlyaverysmallnumberofacademicstudieshavethusfarfocusedonthisformofpoliticalviolence9,whichhascreatedadangerouslevelofignoranceandaworryinglackofexpertiseregardingthethreatassessmentofthefar-right.10Thisarticlewillprovideanintroductiontothecurrentsituationregardingright-wingviolenceinWesternEurope,withafocusonitstacticalandstrategicaspects,andreviewrelatedimplicationsforsecurityinEuropeandtheUnitedStates.Thisarticlearguesthatthisspecificformofpoliticalviolencebearsanumberofuniquecharacteristicsthatmakeitharderforsecurityagenciestodetectandappropriatelyreactto,especiallybecausethecomparisonwithIslamistextremismhascreatedpoliticalandtacticalbiasesthathindertheadaptationsneededtoaddressthisthreat.Anin-depthcasestudyofGermanyisprovidedtoillustratewhatthatthreatcouldlooklikeandtorevealthepotentiallydevastatingconsequencesforanation’ssecuritythatmayresult.Itisnecessary,however,toseethisformoforganizedviolenceinthecontextofthewiderfar-rightmovementinEurope,andtheWest,asright-winggroupstypicallyareverywellconnectedacrossborders,displaysignificantcollectivelearning,andtosomeextentseeeachotherasinspirationfortheirowntacticsandmodesofoperation.11Asonlyabriefoverviewiswithinthescopeofthisarticle,anothergoalistoraiseawarenessaboutthelackofknowledgeandunderstandingregardingextremeright-wingviolence,whichposesaseverethreattointernalsecurityinmanyWesterncountries.
TheFar-Right:InterplayofInternationalandNationalAffairs
Throughoutthelastdecade,Europehasseenamajorsurgeofelectoralsuccessesfornationalistandfar-rightparties.12Currently,39Europeancountrieshavenationalistandextremeright-wingpartiesrepresentedintheirparliaments(excludingTurkeyandRussia).Whileinmanycasesthesepartieshavegainedonlyminorinfluenceornominalrepresentation,theyhaveseenmajor—andunexpected—successesinanumberofothercountries,includingFrance(NationalFront),Sweden(SwedenDemocrats),Greece(GoldenDawn),Poland(LawandJustice),theNetherlands(PartyforFreedom),andDenmark(DanishPeople’sParty).Itisespeciallynoteworthythatfar-rightpartiesseemtohavegainedstrongsupportasaresultoftheongoingrefugeecrisisaswellasIslamist-motivatedterroristattacks.Theseexternaleventsdirectedagainstaspecificcountryhavebeenshowntoincreaseelectoralsupportforextremeright-wingpartiesandmaybelinkedtopeaksofright-wingterrorismandviolence.13Boldandrhetoricallyviolentanti-immigrationandEuro-skepticplatformsofright-wingpartiesarguablymightalsoincreasesupportformoreviolentactionsbysmallclandestinegroups.AftertheParisterrorattacksofJanuary7andNovember13,2015,theextremeright-wingpartytheNationalFrontscoredthehighestresultsinlocalFrenchelections,winningapproximately30percentofthenationalvoteinDecember2015(comparedwith11percentinthe2010election).14Althoughitwasultimatelydefeatedinthefinalroundofvoting,thisdefeatdidnotdenoteadecreaseinvotersupport.Rather,itwasmerelyaresultofthetacticsemployedbytheoppositionparties,whichutilizedspecialcharacteristicsoftheFrenchelectoralsystem.Afterthe9/11attacks,anti-Muslimhatecrimesandright-wingterrorism(itshouldbenotedtherelationshipbetweenthetwoisheavilydebated)jumped1,600percentintheUnitedStates.15FollowingtheLondonbombingsinJuly2005,policereportedasix-foldincreaseintherateofright-wingviolenceagainstMuslims.IntheaftermathoftheCharlieHebdoattacksinJanuary2015,similarincidentsroseby281percentinFrance.16
Assuch,possiblelinksandsupportivecollaboration,ifnotoutrightinstitutionalizedcooperation,betweenclandestineorextra-parliamentarygroupsandestablishedpoliticalpartiesfromtheright-wingspectrummustbetakenintoaccountwhenconsideringright-wingterrorismandpoliticalviolence.Thoughahighlyunder-researchedtopic,afewstudieshavelookedatthisintersectionandfoundmixedresults.Forexample,whilePaulWilkinson,theformerdirectoroftheUniversityofSt.Andrews’CentrefortheStudyofTerrorismandPoliticalViolence,foundnoclearcorrelationbetweenelectoralresultsofextremeright-wingpoliticalpartiesandviolencefromsmallright-winggroups,hedidaffirmthattheambivalentstandpointoffar-rightpartiestowardviolence,aswellastheirracistandxenophobicpropaganda,wereconducivetoright-wingterrorism.17Inotherwords,right-wingpartiesandmovementsdohaveaninfluenceonlevelsofeverydayandgeneralxenophobiaandracismthatare,inturn,intensifiedandmadeexplicitinsmaller,moreextremistgroups.18Inaddition,morenuancedstudiesshowedasignificantriseinright-wing-motivatedarsonattacksfollowingverbalshiftsinthemainstreampoliticaldebatetowardmorexenophobiclanguage.19Whilenotthefocusofthisarticle,itisreasonabletodeducefromtheexistingresearchthatright-wingterrorismandviolencecannotbecompletelyseparatedfromfar-rightpartiesandmassmovements,althoughthespecificrelationshipsbetweenthetworemainunclear.
DecadesofRight-WingExtremismintheWest
Right-wingextremismhasmotivatedsomeofthedeadliestactsofdomesticterrorisminanumberofWesterncountries.Thefollowingexamplesrepresentonlyaverysmallselectionofmorewidelyknownattackscommittedbyfar-rightextremistsinrecentdecades.InAugust1980,twomembersofasplintercelloftheItalianright-wingterroristgroupNewOrderbombedtheBolognatrainstation,killing85andwoundingmorethan200.20Thatsameyear,thedeadliestterroristattackinpost-WorldWarIIGermany—thebombingoftheMunichOktoberfestbyatleastoneneo-Nazi—left13peopledeadandanother2,011wounded.21AnotherdevastatingattackwascarriedoutonApril19,1995byTimothyMcVeighandtwoaccomplices,whousedacarbombtoattacktheAlfredP.MurrahFederalBuildinginOklahomaCity.PlannedbyMcVeigh,whowasinspiredbytheright-wingextremistnovelTheTurnerDiaries,thebombingkilled168andwoundedmorethan600.22ItisoneofthedeadliestterroristattacksinthehistoryoftheUnitedStates.
In2009,IanDavison,aBritishneo-Naziandwhitesupremacist,andhissonwerearrestedforplanningchemicalweaponsattacksusinghomemadericinaspartoftheright-wingterroristorganizationAryanStrikeForce.23Authoritiesuncoveredtheplot,andDavisonwassentencedto10yearsinprison.HeiscurrentlytheonlyBritishcitizenarrestedforandconvictedofmanufacturingachemicalweapon.Twoyearslater,onJuly22,2011,AndersBehringBreivik,aright-wingextremist,detonatedacarbombinOslocitycenter,killing8,andthendrovetotheislandofUtøyatocontinuehisattack,killingafurther69people,manyofthemchildren,inamassshooting.24Seventy-sevenpeopleintotalwerekilledduringtherampage.Priortocarryingouttheattack,Breivikhadpublishedamanifestothatlaidouthisideology,whichwasbasedonChristianfundamentalismandculturalracism.
TheseexamplesdemonstratethattheWesthasalonghistoryofviolentactsperpetratedbyextremeright-wingactors.Since2012,therefugeecrisisacrossEuropehascontributedtoanupsurgeinsupportforright-wingpartiesandviolentnetworks.Xenophobicandanti-immigrationcrimesandsocialmovementshaveincreasedinalmostallEuropeancountries.Thusamajorquestionforresearchers,policymakers,andlawenforcementpersonnelinEuropeandNorthAmericaiswhetherextremeright-wingterrorismandviolencedisplayuniquetacticalorstrategiccharacteristicsthatmakeithardertodetectandcounter.
TheNatureofRight-WingViolenceandTerrorism
DefiningtheThreat
Oneproblematicissueconnectedtoidentifyingandadequatelyclassifyingright-wingterrorismisthelackofclarityamongthedifferentconceptsusedtodescribethisformofpoliticalviolence.Infact,manyincidentsofright-wingterrorismhavebeenanalyzedundertheconceptof“hatecrime,”25whichdoesshareanumberofsimilarcharacteristicswithterrorism.26Ahatecrime—definedas“acriminalactthatismotivatedbyabiastowardthevictimorvictimsrealorperceivedidentitygroup”27—caninclude,forexample,thedesireto“terrorizeabroadergroup”28ortocreateaspecificintimidation,includingthroughhatespeech,whichhasbeendescribedassimplyanothermanifestationofterrorism.29Thesimilaritiesbetweenhatecrimesandterrorismhaveledsomescholarstocalltheformera“closecousin”ofterrorismbecause“thetargetofanoffenseisselectedbecauseofhisorhergroupidentity,notbecauseofhisorherindividualbehaviour,andbecausetheeffectofbothistowreakterroronagreaternumberofpeoplethanthosedirectlyaffectedbyviolence.”30Otherscholarshavedisagreed,however,andarguedthatthetwoareinfactdistinctformsofviolencemoreakinto“distantrelatives”thanclosecousinsbasedonkeydifferencessuchasthelackofplanningandthespontaneouscharacterofhatecrimes,thedownwardnatureofhatecrimes(minoritygroupastarget),andthelackofpublicity.31Reviewingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenhatecrimesandterrorism,Millsetal.maintainthat“hatecrimesattacksocietyatlargebyattackingitsnorms,targetingdearlyheldvaluesofequality,liberty,andbasichumanrights.”32Suchaconceptionofhatecrimesalignsthemwiththe“upward”natureofterrorism,refutingclaimsthathatecrimesareonlya“downwardcrime.”Notattemptingtosolvethisconceptualdebatehere,itisstillreasonabletoassumethatthereisarelationshipbetween“hatecrimes”and“terrorism,”bothintheireffects(thatis,creatingfear)andinthewaytheirperpetratorsoperate.Itisalsoreasonabletoassumethatthestepfromcommittinghatecrimestocommittingterrorismismuchsmallerandeasiertotakethanthatfrom“ordinarycrime”(ornocriminalactivity)toterrorism.Hatecrimesseemtoprovideabridgeandanideologicaltestingphaseforcatalyzingpotentialmotivationsforviolentaction(forexample,hate,fear,aggression,power)withtheideologicalcalltoact.
CaseStudies
Inordertoassessthetacticalandstrategicdimensionsofright-wingpoliticalviolenceandterrorism,itiscriticaltofindasuitableempiricaldatabase.Thosecountrieswiththelargestandmostviolentright-wingmovements,inadditiontohavingadequatestatisticsandaminimumofgoodqualityresearch,aretheUnitedStates,Germany,andRussia.Withouttheneedtorecapitulatethehistoryandstructureoftheviolentextremeright-wingmovementsinthesecountries,thissectionfocusesonsomekeystrategiclessonslearnedforpolicymakersandlawenforcementpersonnelregardingthecharacterofright-wingterroristicviolence.33
UnitedStates
Numeroushigh-qualityassessmentshavebeenpossibleinrecentyearsasaresultofdetaileddatabasesondomesticextremismandterrorismcompiledfromavarietyofprojects.TheseincludetheTerrorismandExtremistViolenceintheUnitedStates(TEVUS)databaseattheNationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandtheResponsestoTerrorism(START);theGlobalTerrorismDatabase(GTD);theU.S.ExtremistCrimeDatabase(ECDB);theAmericanTerrorismStudy(ATS);andtheProfilesofPerpetratorsofTerrorismintheUnitedStates(PPT-US)database.
Oneofthecorefindingsregardingthecharacteristicsofright-wingviolencebasedontheU.S.sampleisthattheextremerighthasnotjustdevelopedstrategicconceptsbasedonsmall-unitorlone-actortactics(forexample,“leaderlessresistance”),buthasalsoshownastronguseofthesetacticsinpractice.Whetherornotthisisduetoalackoforganizationalskills,34manystudieshaveshownthatlone-actorterrorismisthemostprominenttacticfortheAmericanextremeright.Perliger’sdataset,forexample,showsthat54percentof4,420incidentsbetween1990and2012werecommittedbysingleperpetratorsand20percentby2-persongroups.35TheSouthernPovertyLawCenter,examining63incidentsbetweenApril2009andFebruary2015,foundthat74percentoftheattackswerecarriedoutbyloneactors.36Inanalyzing198lone-actorattacks,sociologistRamónSpaaijfoundthatright-wingactorsconstitutedthesecond-largestcategory(17percent),followingonlyattacksinwhichtheperpetrator’sideologicalconvictionremainsunknown.37Asimilarstudyof119lone-actorsfoundthat34percenthadanextremeright-wingbackground;asubsequent,moredetailedanalysisof111EuropeanandAmericanlone-actorterroristsshowedthatright-wingattackersrepresentedthelargestgroup(39percent),aheadofevenalQaeda-inspiredperpetrators(34percent).38
Itthusappearsthat,althoughfarfromexclusivelyright-wing,lone-actorterrorismisahighlypreferredtacticofright-wingviolence.Anumberofstudieshavelookedatthespecialcharacteristicsoffar-rightlone-actorattacksandhomicides,bothinrelationtonon-right-winghomicides39andtoorganizedright-wingextremistgroups.40Inthefirstcase,themajorfindingsrevealthatfar-rightlone-actorattackshavesignificantlydecreasedsincetheearly2000s(withatotalof96homicidesbetween1990and2008),havebeenperpetratedbyindividualsmuchmorelikelytodisplaymentalhealthissues(40percent),andtargetedmostlystrangers.41Lone-actorsalsoseemtotargetgovernmentandmilitaryinstallationsmorefrequentlyandareolderonaveragethanotherdomesticextremistswhoarepartofanorganizedgroup.42Comparedwithotherlone-actorterrorists(Islamistextremistorsingleissue),right-wingterroristsaresignificantlymorelikelytohavepreviousmilitaryexperience,workinconstruction,andinteractfacetofacewithawidernetwork,andarelesslikelytoreceivehelporbepartofanycommandandcontrolstructure.43
Thesestudiesoflone-actorshaverevealedprofilesofright-wingextremiststhatareseeminglydetached(butnotuninfluenced)byright-winggroups,perhapsbecauseofmentalhealthissuesandatendencytofocusongovernment-relatedtargets,bothofwhichwouldincreasetherisksofdetectionandinterferencebygovernmentauthoritiesfororganizedright-winggroups.44Thispicture,however,doesnotfitintoaconsciousstrategyof“leaderlessresistance”bythefar-right;rather,itismorelikelyaconceptdesignedtofitacertaintypeofactivistwhowouldactaloneanywayandtolabeltheoccurringviolenceaspartofa“masterplan.”
Russia
OnekeylessonlearnedfromtheRussiancaseishowthegovernment’sweakresponsetotheriseofmoremilitantright-winggroupsintheearly2000sprovidedpoliticalopportunitiesforformalorganizationstointeractandjoinforceswithviolentskinheadgroupsandlocalcommunity-basedmovements.45Asinothercountries,theRussianfar-rightisnothomogenous,andconsistsofmanydifferentgroupsandstyles.AccordingtoMartinLaryšandMirslavMareš,themostimportantoftheseareunorganizedindividuals,short-termlocalmassmovementsevolvingaroundethnicconflicts,violentyouthgangs,anduniformedparamilitarystructures(includingterroristgroups).46ThesegroupsappeartobeunitedbytheircommonuseofRussiannationalismandimperialism.OneparticularlyworryingtrendisthepotentialforlargenumbersofRussianmilitaryveteranswithcombatexperienceinChechnya,Ukraine,orGeorgiatobeincorporatedintohighlymilitantright-wingundergroundcells.
ResearchontheRussianextremerighthasprovidedvaluableinsightsintodifferenttypesofright-wingcrimesandgroupstructures,suchasadhochatecrimes,large-scalemasspogromsorganizedbyright-wingorganizationsaroundindividualconflicts,andorganizedviolence(includingparamilitarybranchesofexistingextremistorganizations,violentstreetgangs,terroristgroups).47Terroristincidents—suchasthebombattackontheCherkizovskyMarketinMoscowin2006,theattemptedbombingofaMcDonald’srestaurantin2005,attacksonpolicestationsandrailways,orthelivebroadcastofexecutions—showtheescalationofviolenceandtheradicalizationprocessoftheRussianfar-right,whichcanbecomparedwiththesituationinGermanysince2011.48Itisworthnotingthatstrategicconceptsbehindtheseactsofviolencehavebeenframedas“counter-stateterror”withthegoal“todestabilisethestatesystemandtoinducepanicinsociety,whichaccordingtotheoristsofcounter-stateterror,willleadtoaneo-Nazirevolution.”49Thisapproachissimilartowhathasbeencalleda“strategyoftension”usedbyItalian,Belgian,andGermanright-wingterrorists.50
Germany
TheFederalOfficefortheProtectionoftheConstitution(BundesamtfürVerfassungsschutz[BfV]),theGermandomesticintelligenceservice,estimatedthattherewere21,000far-rightextremistactivistsin2014,includingapproximately7,200fromthesubculturalmilieu(forexample,“skinheads”),5,600neo-Nazis,andanestimated6,850membersoffar-rightparties.51Ofthese21,000extremists,Germanauthoritiesregardafull50percent(10,500)as“violenceoriented,”meaningtheyarepreparedtouseviolencetoadvancetheirpoliticalgoals.52Althoughthenumberofactivistshasdecreasedslightlyoverthelastfewyears—fromanestimated22,150in2012—thenumberofrightwing-motivatedcrimescertainlyhasnot.In2014,Germanauthoritiescounted1,029violenthatecrimes(“right-wingpoliticallymotivated”),includingmorethan900casesofcriminalassault,anincreaseof22.9percentand23.3percent,respectively,fromthepreviousyear.53Thissurgeoccurredevenbefore2015,whenthelargestnumbersofrefugeesarrivedinGermany.In2014,26violentattacksonmosqueswereperpetratedbyright-wingextremists—anumberdwarfedbytheexplosiveincreaseinviolentright-wingattacksagainstrefugeehomesinrecentyears.54Whileauthoritiescounted58oftheseincidentsin201355,right-wingextremistsattackedrefugeehomes175timesin2014.In2015,theFederalCriminalPolice(Bundeskriminalamt[BKA])counted901violentactsagainstrefugeesheltersbyindividualswitharight-wingbackground,outof1,005totalattacks.56Ninety-fouroftheseattackswerearson,comparedwithjustsixarsonattacksin2014.ThisincreasereflectsastrongradicalizationwithintheGermanfar-right,especiallyinregardtotheopenuseofviolence,resemblingthewaveofarsonattacksagainstrefugeehomesintheearly1990sfollowingGermanreunification.
AlthoughtheGermanfar-rightmovementhistoricallyhasbeenextremelyviolent—officially,69right-wingattacksbetween1990and2015caused75casualties,thoughcivilsocietywatchdogscountedupto184deaths—thiswidespreaduseofnon-clandestinepoliticalviolencecanbeseenasextraordinary.57Currently,therearenoextensiveanddetailedstatisticsregardingthelevelofright-wingextremistviolenceandterrorismdirectedagainstMuslimpersonsorinstitutions,buttheriseofthenewEuropean“Counter-Jihad”Movement(ECJM)isindicativeofthegrowingimportanceofIslamophobicviolenceperpetratedbytheextremeright.58Basedonculturalnationalism,ECJMhasidentifiedIslamandMuslimimmigrationasmajorthreatstoEurope.59Inrecentyears,anumberofright-wingterroristcellsthathadplannedtoattackmosques,Salafistpreachers,andrefugeesheltershavebeendetectedinGermany.
Arecentprojecttobuildadatabaseonright-wingterrorismandstrategicpoliticalviolencehasproducedanumberofimportantinsightsaboutthecharacteristicsofGermanfar-rightterroristssince1963.60Analysisofqualitativeandquantitativedatarevealsthat,since1971,91right-wingterroristactors(groupsandindividualsthatcouldbeidentified)havecarriedout123attacks(includingbothsuccessfulandunsuccessfulattempts)usingexplosives;2,173arsonattacks;229murders;12kidnappings;56casesofextortion;and174armedrobberies.Thisdatabaseallowsforadditionalstrategicanalysis,largelysupportingthefindingsfromothercountries.Ofthe91identifiableGermanright-wingterroristactors,approximately70percentareeithersmallcellswith2-3members,smallgroupsof4-9members,orlone-actors.
Theseactorsutilizemainlysmall-unittactics(forexample,explosives,targetedassassinations,arson,and,onoccasion,hostage-takingandkidnapping)againstgovernmentrepresentatives,Jews,leftists,and“foreigners.”Throughoutthelast50years,bombingshavebeenthemaintacticofchoice,especiallysince1990.Inearlierdecades,assassinationswerealsousedwidely,butthelast20yearshaveseenasignificantdecreaseintheemploymentofthistactic.Priorto2000,governmentrepresentatives(forexample,policeofficers,politicians,andmilitarypersonnel)madeupapproximatelyhalfoftheintendedtargets.Sincethen,however,thegroupsandindividualstargetedbyright-wingextremistshavevariedmorewidely.ThevastmajorityofGermanright-wingterroristactors(approximately72percent)areactivefornolongerthanayearbeforetheyareeitherkilled,detectedandarrestedbytheauthorities,ordisbanded.Ifanactorsurvivesformorethanayear,however,thechancesoflong-termactivityrapidlyincrease,withapproximately14percentremainingactiveforbetween1and5yearsand13percentformorethan5years.Theselong-termclandestinecellsarealsomuchmorelikelytoconductattackswithoutbeingdetectedandtodevelophighlyprofessionaltacticstoavoidarrest.
Anothercommoncharacteristicofright-wingterrorismingeneral,aswellasinGermany,isthelackofpubliccommunicationregardingattacks(forexample,claimingresponsibilitythroughletters,statements,andcommuniqués).InGermany,onlyabout24percentofperpetratorsactuallysendoutanyformofclaimornote.Onepossiblereasonforthismaybetheirdesiretoemploya“strategyoftension”inconnectionwiththeirattacks,thatis,toproducechaosandinsecurityamongthepopulationinordertoincreaseelectoralsupportfor(right-wing)“lawandorder”parties.61Thisstrategycouldalsobeusedtodemonstratetheweaknessandpowerlessnessofthetargetedgovernment.Anothertheorybroughtforwardmorerecentlyarguesthattheuseofterrorismbyright-wingextremistsisanaturalconsequenceofextreme-rightideologiesandthereforedoesnotrequireanycommunicatedexplanation.62Manyright-wingattacksmightbeself-explanatory(e.g.,abombattackagainstasynagogueoramosquemotivatedbyanti-SemitismorIslamophobia)andcanachievetheresultofterrorizingthetargetedvictimgroupevenwithoutanycommunication.Athirdapproachtoexplainingthislackofstrategiccommunicationdrawsonright-wingextremisttacticalconceptssuchasleaderlessresistance,inwhichpublicstatementsareseenasariskfactorfordetection.63
CollectiveRight-WingAnti-ImmigrationViolence
Inadditiontoorganizedright-wingclandestinecellsandgroups,anotherhighlyproblematicdevelopmentbecameevidentinrecentyearsacrossEurope:anti-immigrationmassmovementsandcollectiveradicalizationtowardsviolence.
Between1991and1994,authoritiescounted1,499rightwing-motivatedarsonattacksagainstrefugeesheltersinGermany.64Between1990and1995,the295individualsconvictedintheseattacks,whichaccountforabout60percentoftheincidents,displayedaveryatypicalperpetratorpatternatthattime.65Sixty-threepercentoftheperpetratorshadnotbeenpreviouslyconvictedofanycrimeandonly21percentwereknowntobeactiveinaright-wingpartyorskinheadgroup.Approximately68percentoftheperpetratorswereintoxicatedduringtheattack,andin60percentofthecasesdocumentedbycourtstherewasalmostnotimeinvestedinplanningorpreparingtheattack.66Thesecharacteristicsmakeitextremelychallengingforintelligenceandlawenforcementofficialstodetectandcountersuchattacks.Further,whiletheorganizationalcharacteristicsoftheseattackscertainlydidnotfitthetypicalpictureof“terrorism”inGermanyatthattime,theperpetrators’intentdid.Inthemajorityofcases,therelationshipbetweenvictimandperpetratorwasirrelevant;themainmotivewastoachieveahighmediaimpacttoconveyamessageagainstthegovernmentandalargehatedgroupofimmigrants.67
Althoughthequalityofthepoliticalmessageandsignalwasnotsophisticatedorembeddedinalong-term,group-basedstrategy,thecombinationofviolentprotestagainstimmigrationandtheattempttoforcerefugeestoleavethecountrythroughfearshowstheterroristqualityoflargeandspontaneouslyactinggroupsbasedinajointunderstandingandunity,guidedbyright-wingextremistideology.Theviolentpotentialofalargeandinfuriatedcrowdhasbecomeespeciallyvisibleinthesecondwaveofright-wingviolenceagainstrefugeehomesthatstartedin2013.Again,theupsurgeinviolenceappearstohavebeencausedbyawidespreadnegativepublicdebateaboutimmigration,aswasthecaseinthefirstwaveofattacksintheearly1990s.68SincetheoutbreakofconflictsinSyria,Iraq,NorthAfrica,andtheMiddleEastintheaftermathof2011’s“ArabSpring,”thenumberofrefugeesandasylumseekersinGermanyhassteadilyrisentoanestimated1.5millionin2015.Thenumberofviolentattacksagainsthousinginstallationsforrefugeeshasmirroredthisincrease.69Thistime,however,right-wingextremistshavediversifiedtheirviolenttacticstoincludearsonattacksagainstdesignated(butuninhabited)refugeehomes,directthreatsagainstpoliticians,violentclasheswiththepolicetaskedtoprotecttherefugees,andtheuseofcarbombsandexplosives.Still,thetwofoldobjectiveoftheattackswastoprotestagainstthegovernment’simmigrationpoliciesandtoeitherforcerefugeesoutofcertainareasorthreatenthemnottocomeinthefirstplace.
Althoughnostatisticalevaluationsorscientificstudiesaboutthissecondwaveoflarge-scaleviolenceagainstrefugeehomesexistthusfar,theinitialdatasuggeststhatthereareatleastsomesimilaritiestothefirstwave.Forexample,inoneanalysis,outof148perpetratorsidentifiedbytheauthorities,only41(27.7percent)hadbeenconvictedofpreviouscrimes;themajoritywerenotactiveinanyorganizedright-winggroup.70Different,however,seemstobetheroleofalcohol.Only32perpetrators(21.6percent)wereintoxicatedduringtheattacks,comparedtoafull68percentintheearly1990s.Thispicturewassupportedbyasubsequentpoliceanalysisof228perpetrators.71Ofthese,just14peoplehadcommittedtwoormoreoftheattacks,andalcoholwasonlyrarelyinvolved.72Althoughabout50percentoftheperpetratorswereknowntothepoliceduetopreviouscrimes,onlyone-thirdhadcommittedright-wingcrimesofanysortbeforeattackingarefugeehome.73
Focusingexclusivelyonthearsonattacks,anotherinternalstudyconductedbytheBKAshowsaclearradicalizationandescalationoftheviolenceused,whichshiftedfromtargetinguninhabitedtoinhabitedbuildingsin40ofthe61cases.Themajorityoftheperpetratorsintheseattackswerenotpartofanorganizedright-winggroup.74AnadditionalstudybytheGermannewspaperDieZeit,whichexaminedonlyattackscarriedoutagainstrefugeesheltersbetweenJanuaryandNovember2015(atotalof222incidents)thatseriouslyharmedorendangeredrefugees,foundthatauthoritieswereabletoidentifytheperpetratorsandgatherenoughevidencetochargeorconvicttheminonly5percentofthecases.75Thesamestudyalsorevealsthatalmosthalfofthe93arsonattacksagainstrefugeeshelterswithinthesametimeframeweredirectedatinhabitedbuildings,signifyingacontinuingescalationofviolenttactics.
PartiessuchastheNationalDemocraticPartyofGermanyandTheThirdWayhavebeeninvolvedinorganizingprotestgroupsonline(typicallyviaFacebook)andstirringupanti-refugeesentimentswithfalsifiedstatisticsofimmigrants’crimesorclaimsofspecificeventswitnessedbyfriendsandcolleagues,suchasincidentsofrapeorchildabductionbyrefugees.76PartieslikeTheThirdWayhavealsopublishedguidebooksonhowtoorganizelarge-scaleprotests,andhaveofficiallyregistereddemonstrationsthat,inthemajorityofcases,devolvedintoviolentactionortookplaceshortlybeforearsonattacks.77Inthisway,right-wingparties,althoughnotproventobedirectlyinvolvedintheattacks,havecontributedtoariseinlevelsofhostilitythroughoutGermanyandprovidedtheopportunityforrightwing-motivatedviolence.Inaddition,right-wingpoliticalpartieshavetriedtogainsupportfromtherathernewphenomenonofright-wingpopulistprotestmovementssuchasPEGIDA(PatrioticEuropeansagainsttheIslamizationoftheOccident)anditsfranchisesacrossGermany.78Thoughsomeattackshavebeencarriedoutbyorganizedneo-Naziswhotookpartinanti-immigrationrallies,mostoftheseviolentactswereseeminglyperpetratedbyindividualswithnotiestotheformalextremeright-wingmovement,butwhosemotivationsmirroredthosedeeplyembeddedinright-winganti-immigrationprotestmovements.Itisknownthatinsomeinstancesmilitantright-wingextremistshaveco-organizedorparticipatedinthesedemonstrations,therebycreatingadirect,butcompletelynon-institutional,linkbetweenorganized,militant,andexperiencedneo-Nazisandotherwise“normal”citizens(thatis,citizensnotpreviouslyknownforright-wingextremistinvolvement)protestingprimarilyagainstimmigrationandrefugeepolicies.TheBavarianfranchiseofPEGIDA,forexample,wasorganizedbytwoneo-Naziswhoweresentencedtoprisononterrorismchargesin2003.79Inaddition,theorganizersandspeakersatthePEGIDAfranchisesinDüsseldorf,Duisburg,andThuringiaaremostlyhard-coreright-wingextremists.80
Althoughtheaspectsofspontaneity,largecrowdswithouthierarchyororganization,andintoxicationareatypicalforthetypeofpoliticalviolenceusuallyassociatedwithterrorism,thisright-wingcollectiveviolencedisplaysotheressentialcharacteristicsthatplaceitintothatverycategory.Oneofthefirstgoalsofright-wingcollectiveviolenceistodirectlychallengethegovernment’smonopolyofforce.Second,thesecollectiveattackscreateterrorandfearinawidetargetgroupbeyondthevictimsoftheattackitself.Third,theseactsofviolence,especiallyarson,arecarriedoutwithastrongmotivationtosendasignalorcreateapublicsymbolofresistanceforawideaudience.Fourth,thistypeoftacticallowstheperpetratortostrategicallyattackandhideimmediatelyafterwardinthelargecrowdofbystandersortoescapefromthelocationaltogether.Inthisway,collectiveright-wingviolenceisakintocoreterroristtactics,althoughlesscoordinatedandstrategic.Right-wingorganizations,parties,andgroupshavebeencarefulnottodirectlycoordinateorleadtheseattacks,butrathertostiruptheclimateofpanic,fear,hate,andurgencytoactamongthelocalpopulation.
SimilarwavesofarsonattacksagainstrefugeeshelterscarriedoutbymembersoflargeprotestmovementshavealsooccurredinSweden,81Finland,82andotherEuropeancountries.Theformationofviolentvigilantegroupsaspartofanti-immigrationmovementsacrossEurope,withtheproclaimedgoalof“protecting”Europeancitizensagainstcriminalimmigrantsisaveryrecentandcompletelynewdevelopment,andposestheriskofcollaborationbetweenhighlyorganizedandexperiencedclandestinecellsandindividualsfrommassmovementswhohavenopreviouscriminalrecordsbutarereadytocommitviolence.
AcomparablemovementintheUnitedStates,thesovereigncitizenmovement,iscomposedofahighlydiverseandlooselyconnectednetworkofindividualsandgroupswhorejectU.S.laws,taxation,currency,andthegovernment’slegitimacy,especiallyregardingthecontroloffirearms.83Frequentoverlapinthemembershipofmoremilitantandviolentmilitiasandwhitesupremacistshasresultedinanumberofviolentattacksbybothindividualsandgroups,aswellasclasheswithlawenforcementagencies.84Forexample,TimothyMcVeigh’saccompliceintheOklahomaCitybombing,TerryNichols,wasamemberofthesovereigncitizenmovement.Therealsohavebeenanumberofviolentstandoffsbetweensovereigncitizenmembersandfederallawenforcementagencies(forexample,the“Bundystandoffs”in2014and2016),andthemurdersofanumberofpoliceofficershavebeenattributedmembersofthenetwork.85AsaresultofincreasedlethalviolencedirectedagainsttheU.S.governmentbysovereigncitizenmembers,includingthemurdersofsixpoliceofficersandatleastthreeplannedterroristattackssince2010,theFBIhaslabeledthenetworkasa“domesticterroristmovement.”86
AlthoughEuropeananti-immigrationmassmovementslikePEGIDAarestillverydifferentfromthehighlyarmedandoftenextremelyviolentsovereigncitizens,theydoshareanumberofimportantcharacteristics,signalinganewstrategicandtacticalerainthemilitantextremeright.Bydiversifyingfurtherandmovingawayfromarelianceonlone-actorattacks(althoughnotreturningtothelarge-scale,paramilitaryorganizationsofthe1980sand1990s),thisnewtypeoffluidnetwork,centeredaroundsharedoppositiontothedemocraticgovernmentandimmigration,canmobilizelargenumbersofactivistsfrommainstreamsocietyandcreatesomethingIwouldcall“hive”terrorism:terroristactsorviolenthatecrimescommittedbyaspontaneouslyformedcrowdthatquicklydisbandsaftertheincident.WesternEuropeanlawenforcementagenciesarecurrentlystrugglingtounderstandthisnewthreatandformulateadequateresponses.ItiscomparabletoneitheranIslamistextremistterrorattackinregardtodetectablecommunication,structures,andpreparation,nortotheotherendofthetypology,theneo-Nazilone-actor.
Conclusion
Right-wingterrorismhasoperatedbothtraditionallyandtacticallyusingverysmallgroups,cells,andlone-actorstotargetmainlygovernmentrepresentativesandminoritieswithexplosivesandtargetedassassinations.Theseattacks,whichusuallydonotattempttoinflictindiscriminatemasscasualties(atacticwhichneverthelessseemstobegainingincreasedprominence),haveonlyveryrarelybeenaccompaniedbysomeformofpubliccommunication(thatis,thepublicclaimingoftheattack).Thisindicatesthatright-wingterroristsdonotneedorwanttocommunicatetheircourseofactiontoapotentialaudience.Onereasonforthisisthatright-wingattacksareoftenself-explanatory(forexample,bombingamosquecansuccessfullygeneratefearandterrorwithinthetargetgroupevenwithoutsomeoneclaimingtheattack).AsProfessorMarkHammpointsout,right-wingpoliticalviolencecan,infact,bebothhatecrimeandterrorism.87Thisalsoimpliesthatterroristviolenceisinherentlypartoftheright-wingextremistideologyandisnotperceivedbytheperpetratorsassomethinginneedofexplanation.Inaddition,thisraisesthedangerthattheintentandnatureofanattackwillbemisjudgedasunplanned,erratic,spontaneous,orasanisolatedincident.Thefindingsabove,however,suggestotherwise.Right-wingterrorismisahighlydangerousformofpoliticalviolenceandasignificantthreatbecauseittacticallyandstrategicallyaimstoblendinwiththesurroundingsocietiesinordertominimizerepressionandcountermeasuresandtomaximizetheeffectsregardingthemaingoal:winningalong-termwaragainsttheirenemies(thatis,democraticgovernmentsandforeigners).
AnotherdevelopmentcausedbythemassiveinfluxofrefugeesthatposespotentialriskstoWesternsocietiesisthespreadofanti-immigration,right-wing,populistmassmovementsacrossEurope,whichhavedisplayedasteadyprocessofradicalizationtowardtheuseofviolence.Inaddition,theboundariesbetweenlarge-scaleanti-immigrationprotestmovementsandorganizedmilitantgroupshavebeenincreasinglyblurred.Asthecharacteristicsoftheperpetratorsofxenophobicarsonattacksshow,securityagencieswillbefacingadifferenttypeofthreat:spontaneousandrarelyplanned,violentandoftenlethalattacksagainstrefugeehomes,mosques,police,orleft-wingactivists,carriedoutbyindividualsorsmallgroupswithoutpreviouscriminalrecordsorevenhistoryofinvolvementinorganizedfar-rightgroups.
Insum,thekeylessonsforlawenforcementpersonnelandpolicymakersare:
1.Right-wingterrorismisauniqueformofpoliticalviolencewithfluidboundariesbetweenhatecrimeandorganizedterrorism.Ingeneral,right-wingterrorismdoesnotaimforindividualandconcentratedhigh-effectresults,butratherforlong-term,low-intensity“warfare”againsttheirenemies.Theeffectsofcreatinghorrorandfearintheirtargetgroup,however,aresimilartootherformsofterrorism.
2.Lone-actortacticshavedeclinedinrecentyears,althoughtheystilldominatethemilitantright-wingmovement.Adistincttypeofcollective“hive”terrorismhasdevelopedinEurope,embeddedinandcarriedoutbylarge-scale,right-wing,anti-immigrationandanti-governmentmovements,withtheperipheralinvolvementoforganizedandmoremilitantright-wingorganizations.Havingcreatedmanualsandguidebooksonhowtoorganizetheseprotestmovementsanduseonlinesocialmediaplatformstostiruphatred,thisstructurecouldbecomeablueprintfortheUnitedStatesaswell.ThehighnumberofattackscurrentlybeingcommittedinthewakeofthesemovementsinWesternEuropecouldpotentiallybecomemoredangerousiftransferredtothebetter-armedsovereigncitizenmovementorothernetworksintheUnitedStates.
3.Lawenforcementpersonnelcannothopethatfocusingonthedetectionofcommunicationandgroupstructuresbeforeaneventwillbringadequateresults.Biographicalbackgroundsmayincreasinglyinvolveindividualswithoutpreviousconnectiontoanextremistmovement,andsmallgroupscouldformspontaneouslyduringorshortlyafterprotestsandralliesinordertocarryoutarsonattacks,shootings,orotherterroristattacks.
4.WhileitisnottobeexpectedthattherefugeesituationwillescalatetothelevelofsignificanceintheUnitedStatesthatithasinEurope,thesituationincountrieslikeGermany,France,Sweden,andDenmarkhavetaughtneo-Nazisandotherorganizedright-wingextremistshowtoevadegovernmentcrackdownanddetectionbeforeattacks.EvensmallnumbersofrefugeescouldpotentiallybeusedtocatalyzesimilarprotestmovementsonplatformsalreadyestablishedintheUnitedStates.
5.Alastpotentialthreatfromorganizedclandestineoropenviolencecanbereciprocalviolencebetweenright-wingextremistgroupsandthoseopposedtothem.Violentclashesbetweenright-wingpopulistsandSalafistsinGermany,forexample,haveledtofurtherradicalizationonbothsides.RecentclashesinAnaheim,CaliforniabetweenKuKluxKlanmembersandopponentsareanotherexampleofthismechanism.88
Insum,right-wingterrorismorracistpoliticalviolenceremainsoneofthemostdangerousthreatstoWesterndemocracies,especiallybecausetheseextremistgroupshavedevelopedandusedviolenttacticsdesignedtobeoverlookedandmisinterpretedbysecurityagencies.Whitesupremacists,sovereigncitizenmembers,neo-Nazis,andotherright-wingextremistgroupswidelydeployaverydynamicandflexibleformofcollectiveor“hive”terrorismthatdoesnotprovidetraditionalanglesforsecurityagenciestoidentifyhierarchies,long-termplots,orgroupstructures.Thelethalandterrorizingeffectremainsintact,however.Inaddition,thecorrodingeffectagainstdemocraticsocietiesandcommunityresiliencecanbemuchhigherincasesofright-wingterrorismthancomparedwithotherformsbecausetheunderestimationbytheauthoritiesessentiallyprovesrightthesuspicionofminoritiesandotherat-riskgroupsthattheyarewithoutequalprotection.PRISM
Notes
1CharlesKurzmanandDavidSchanzer,“TheGrowingRight-WingTerrorThreat,”TheNewYorkTimes,June16,2015,
延伸文章資訊
- 1Extremism - Wikipedia
Political extremism can be defined as those policies that violate or erode international human ri...
- 2Political Extremism and Radicalism: - Gale
Political Extremism and Radicalism: Far-Right Groups in America centers around groups considered ...
- 3Political Extremism in the Presence of a Free Rider Problem
tering of extremism have generally been viewed as strategic tools in political competition and co...
- 4Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe Current ...
Although not as significant as in Europe, the United States has also seen an upsurge in political...
- 5Some Problems with a Definition and Perception of Extremism ...
Scientists, political authorities and potential extremists can define it in very different ways. ...
